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INTRODUCTION
The long-standing distinction between safe and unsafe abortion is proving unworkable. Not all clandestine abortions in restrictive legal environments are equally unsafe. Decreases in the numbers of severe complications
and maternal deaths related to unsafe abortion are attributed to, among other
* B.A., J.D., University of Toronto; LL.M., Harvard Law School. Co-Director, International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Programme, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto. This article builds on research undertaken in the Health Equity and Law Clinic
(HEAL Clinic) at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto in collaboration with the
International Planned Parenthood Federation/Western Hemisphere Region (IPPF/WHR).
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factors, the use of medicines to terminate a pregnancy: a method of safer
“unsafe” abortion.1
Not all risk, however, is eliminated. Women who self-administer
medicines often lack information on their safe and effective use. The challenge is how to reach women with safer-use information. This Article examines one model of access to information, Health Initiatives Against Unsafe
Abortion (Iniciativas Sanitarias contra el Aborto Provocado en Condiciones
de Riesgo).2 In clinical consultation, physicians provide women who are
ineligible for a lawful abortion with evidence-based information on safer
clandestine methods of pregnancy termination. No information is provided
on where or how to obtain the drug, nor is it prescribed. This innovative
model, developed by Iniciativas Sanitárias, a health professional organization in Uruguay, is referred to throughout the Article as the Uruguay Model.3
The Uruguay Model is expressly characterized as a harm reduction initiative to reduce abortion-related mortality and morbidity.4 Harm reduction
is not, however, the exclusive discourse around the model. It is also promoted as a means to realize reproductive rights.5 Women’s health advocates
have seized upon the Uruguay Model and its expansion to countries across
Latin America as “an important opportunity . . . to position reproductive
rights as an essential part of the body of internationally recognized human
rights, and to concretely apply these rights in a service provision setting.”6
The conceptual links between harm reduction and human rights—both
as approaches to and discourses on social action—are a subject of growing
1
Iqbal Shah & Elisabeth Ahman, Unsafe Abortion in 2008: Global and Regional
Levels and Trends, 18 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 90, 91 (2010).
2
Information on the initiative is gathered from published literature, authored primarily by members of Iniciativas Sanitárias. See generally Leonel Briozzo & Anibal
Faúndes, The Medical Profession and the Defense and Promotion of Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 100 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 291 (2008); Leonel Briozzo,
Ana Labandera, Mónica Gorgoroso & José Enrique Pons, Iniciativas Sanitarias: Una
Nueva Estrategia en el Abordaje del Aborto de Riesgo, in INICIATIVAS SANITARIAS CONTRA EL ABORTO PROVOCADO EN CONDICIONES DE RIESGO 21 (Leonel Briozzo ed., 2007)
[hereinafter Briozzo et al., Iniciatavas Sanitarias]; L. Briozzo, F. Rodrı́guez, I. León, G.
Vidiella, G. Ferreiro & J.E. Pons, Unsafe Abortion in Uruguay, 85 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY
& OBSTETRICS 70 (2004) [hereinafter Briozzo et al., Unsafe Abortion]; L. Briozzo, G.
Vidiella, F. Rodrı́guez, M. Gorgoroso, A. Faúndes & J.E. Pons, A Risk Reduction Strategy to Prevent Maternal Deaths Associated with Unsafe Abortion, 95 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 221 (2006) [hereinafter Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy] ;
Giselle Carino, Jennifer Friedman, Marrcela Rueda Gomez, Carrie Tatum & Leonel Briozzo, A Rights-Based Model: Perspectives from Health Service Providers, in 39 IDS
BULLETIN 77 (Andrea Lynch et al. eds., 2008); Anibal Faúndes, Kamini Rao & Leonel
Briozzo, Right to Protection from Unsafe Abortion and Postabortion Care, 106 INT’L J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 164 (2009).
3
See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (describing the Uruguay Model in
detail).
4
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 222.
5
Briozzo et al., Iniciatavas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 35; Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 223 (describing women as “citizens, with rights, who
should be provided with information”).
6
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 79.
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interest and engagement. In the late 1990s, human rights and harm reduction were rarely mentioned in the same literature,7 although it is argued that
a commitment to human rights has marked the thinking and advocacy of the
harm reduction movement from its outset.8 There is now broad agreement
that harm reduction and human rights enjoy a close kinship or share common cause, each reflecting core principles of the other.9 Their convergence
can be explained as follows. Harm reduction provides the neutral and pragmatic evidence-base to support principled legal argument. Harm reduction,
in other words, offers evidence of the effectiveness of rights-based approaches to health.10 Human rights, in turn, provide normative validation for
harm reduction, namely the legal obligation to act on the evidence of effective interventions to reduce harm.11 “Whether it is easier to establish a basic
human right . . . and then push for public health than to establish public
health and then push for human rights, depends upon the constellation of
political circumstances in a given society at a given moment in history.”12
7
But see Norbert Gilmore, Drug Use and Human Rights: Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability, and Human Rights Infringements, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 355 (1996)
(analyzing the human rights of drug users with reference to the relationship between
public health or harm reduction and human rights); Alex Wodak, Health, HIV Infection,
Human Rights, and Injecting Drug Use, 2 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 24 (1998) (discussing
harm reduction and human rights related to injecting drug users).
8
Richard Elliott, Joanne Csete, Evan Wood & Thomas Kerr, Harm Reduction, HIV/
AIDS, and the Human Rights Challenge to Global Drug Control Policy, 8 HEALTH &
HUM. RTS. 105, 106 (2005).
9
There is growing literature on the relationship between harm reduction and human
rights. See generally Jonathan Cohen & Joanne Csete, As Strong as the Weakest Pillar:
Harm Reduction, Law Enforcement and Human Rights, 17 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 101
(2006) (advocating a human rights approach to injection drug use to achieve public health
objectives); Jonathan Cohen & Daniel Wolfe, Commentary, Harm Reduction and Human
Rights: Finding Common Cause, 22 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME S93
(2008) [hereinafter Cohen & Wolfe, Commentary] (describing how harm reduction and
human rights movements can find affirmation of their core principles in the other); Elliott
et al., supra note 8 (joining human rights law with public health evidence to advocate for
change in the global drug control regime); Ralf Jürgens, Joanne Csete, Joseph J. Amon,
Stefan Baral & Chris Beyrer, People Who Use Drugs, HIV, and Human Rights, 376
LANCET 475 (2010) (seeking to improve understanding of the health and human rights
implications of approaches to drug use and HIV, and demonstrating that human rights
protection is an essential precondition to improving the health of people who use drugs);
Ian Malkin, Richard Elliott & Rowan McRae, Supervised Injection Facilities and International Law, 33 J. DRUG ISSUES 538 (2003) (arguing that pursuant to their international
human rights obligations, states should implement trials of supervised injection facilities,
a harm reduction intervention); Daniel Wolfe & Jonathan Cohen, Human Rights and HIV
Prevention, Treatment, and Care for People Who Inject Drugs: Key Principles and Research Needs, 55 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME S56 (2010) [hereinafter
Wolfe & Cohen, Human Rights and HIV Prevention] (describing the convergence or
common cause between health and human rights advocacy in the injection drug use
context).
10
Sofia Gruskin, Rights-Based Approaches to Health: Something for Everyone, 9
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 5, 6 (2006).
11
Elliot et al., supra note 8, at 106; see also Cohen & Wolfe, Commentary, supra
note 9, at S94.
12
Craig Reinarman, Public Health and Human Rights: The Virtues of Ambiguity, 15
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 239, 240 (2004); see also Elliot et al., supra note 8, at 106 (describ-
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Yet many are unwilling to see the relationship in a purely instrumental
manner, and in this respect, harm reduction and human rights may not form
a perfect union.13 The divergence between the two approaches is attributed
to their different underlying “moral warrants.”14 Human rights are set
against the normative neutrality of harm reduction, which is characterized by
a pragmatic (not principled) approach to health outcomes (not social justice).
Some argue this was not always a feature of harm reduction,15 but reflects a
recent turn toward a “professional, medical management of social
problems” with a “focus on individual consequences and societal costs
rather than their social causes.”16 A normative anchor in human rights is
seen as a means to resuscitate harm reduction as a platform for broad social
change.17
With convergence-divergence as an organizing theme, this Article explores harm reduction and human rights as conceptual approaches to and
discourses about unsafe abortion. The vehicle for this exploration is access
to safer-use information as exemplified by the Uruguay Model.
On convergence, this Article seeks to test the claim that international
human rights law “has evolved to the point where it now imposes . . . obligations on governments to provide, and to refrain from interfering with the
communication of, information that is necessary for the protection and promotion of reproductive health and choice.”18 Access to information is protected in international law through a constellation of human rights. These
rights are articulated in broad terms, but given content and meaning through
interpretation by courts, committees, Special Rapporteurs, and commissions
established to monitor and enforce international human rights law.19 By refing strategic reasons to focus on public health or human rights in argument for a specific
reform).
13
See, e.g., Neil Hunt, Public Health or Human Rights: What Comes First?, 15 INT’L
J. DRUG POL’Y 231, 231 (2004); Reinarman, supra note 12, at 240.
14
Andrew D. Hathaway & Patricia G. Erickson, Drug Reform Principles and Policy
Debates: Harm Reduction Prospects for Cannabis in Canada, 33 J. DRUG ISSUES 465,
484 (2003); see also Andrew D. Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction: Toward a
Morally Invested Drug Reform Strategy, 12 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 125, 135 (2001) [hereinafter Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction].
15
See generally Samuel R. Friedman, Matthew Southwell, Regina Bueno, Denise
Paone, Jude Byrne & Nick Crofts, Commentary, Harm Reduction: A Historical View
from the Left, 12 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 3 (2001) (describing the past and present political
climates that shape and limit the perspectives, strategies, and tactics of harm reduction);
Richard Velleman & Janet Rigby, Harm Minimization: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 1 INT’L
J. DRUG POL’Y 24 (1990) (discussing the controversy around harm reduction concepts).
16
Gordon Roe, Harm Reduction as Paradigm: Is Better than Bad Good Enough? The
Origins of Harm Reduction, 15 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 243, 244–45 (2005).
17
See Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction, supra note 14, at 135; see also
Elliott et al., supra note 8, at 121 (describing human rights as providing a “normative
counterweight”).
18
Sandra Coliver, The Right to Information Necessary for Reproductive Health and
Choice Under International Law, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS
TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION 38, 39 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1995).
19
This Article relies on (1) the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the regional human rights systems; (2)
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erence to this collective jurisprudence, normative validation for harm reduction in unsafe abortion, and specifically access to safer-use information, is
constructed from the human rights to life,20 health,21 non-discrimination,22
and information,23 among others.
On divergence, this Article seeks to make explicit the different moral
warrants underlying harm reduction and human rights in unsafe abortion.
The human rights shortcomings of access to safer-use information via physician-patient consultation, the Uruguay Model, are contrasted against a
model, the Safe Abortion Hotline, driven by an alternative ideology. The
limitations of the pragmatic-neutrality of harm reduction in criminal law reform are set against a human rights approach, which envisions legal reform
in service of broad social change.
I. HEALTH INITIATIVES AGAINST UNSAFE ABORTION:
THE URUGUAY MODEL
The use of medicines to terminate a pregnancy, or medication abortion,
has made unsafe abortion safer.24 Unsafe abortion is defined as “a procedure for terminating an unintended pregnancy that is carried out either by a
person lacking the necessary skills or in an environment that does not conform to the minimal medical standards, or both.”25 Despite strict criminal
abortion laws throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, an estimated
the work of treaty bodies and committees of independent experts in the UN human rights
system, including Concluding Observations (recommendations based on review of State
compliance), General Comments or Recommendations (interpretations on the content of
human rights provisions, thematic issues, or methods of work), and Decisions (issued in a
quasi-judicial capacity on the merits of petitions received from individuals); and (3) the
reports of Special Rapporteurs and human rights commissions (independent expert bodies
appointed to investigate, monitor, and report on thematic human rights issues).
20
See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
4, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18,
1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
21
See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, supra note
20, at 230 (the right to respect for private life, encompassing physical and mental health).
22
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 12, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
23
See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
13, supra note 20, at 148; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, supra note 20, at 230.
24
Shah & Ahman, supra note 1, at 91.
25
Id. at 90 (noting that the definition of unsafe abortion was developed in the late
1980s when most abortions were surgical and/or invasive); see also World Health Organization (“WHO”), Division of Family Health, The Prevention and Management of Unsafe Abortion, at 3, WHO Doc. WHO/MSM/92.5 (Apr. 12–15, 1992) (describing and
defining unsafe abortion).
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four million abortions are performed in the region every year, the vast majority of them clandestine and by the formal definition unsafe.26 Not all
clandestine abortion methods, however, are equally unsafe.
A method in widespread use is women’s self-administration of the drug
misoprostol.27 Misoprostol is a prostaglandin E1 analogue marketed for the
prevention and treatment of gastric ulcers.28 The drug also causes uterine
contractions and cervical ripening, effective in pregnancy termination.29 In
contrast to other clandestine methods, misoprostol use is associated with reduced severity of complications and abortion-related deaths.30 Misoprostol
26

Shah & Ahman, supra note 1, at 94.
See Marı́a Mercedes Lafaurie, Daniel Grossman, Erika Troncoso, Deborah L. Billings & Susana Chávez, Women’s Perspectives on Medical Abortion in Mexico, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru: A Qualitative Study, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 75, 76 (2005)
(“Studies . . . illustrate that women obtain misoprostol either from pharmacies without a
prescription or from physicians, who prescribe or dispense it directly.”); J. Sherris, A.
Bingham, M.A. Burns, S. Girvin, E. Westley & P.I. Gomez, Misoprostol Use in Developing Countries: Results from a Multicountry Study, 88 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 76, 77 (2005). The practice has been widely documented in Brazil. See generally S.
Clark, J. Blum, K. Blanchard, L. Galvão, H. Fletcher & B. Winikoff, Misoprostol Use in
Obstetrics and Gynecology in Brazil, Jamaica, and the United States, 76 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 65; Helena Lutéscia Luna Coêlho, Ana Cláudia Teixeira, Maria
de Fátima Cruz, Sandra Luzia Gonzaga, Paulo Sérgio Arrais, Laura Luchini, Carlo La
Vecchia & Gianni Tognoni, Misoprostol: The Experience of Women in Forteleza, Brazil,
49 CONTRACEPTION 101 (1994); Helena Lutéscia Luna Coêlho, Ana Cláudia Teixeira,
Ana Paula Santos, Eliane Barros Forte, Silvana Macedo Morais, Carlo La Vecchia, Gianni Tognoni & Andrew Herxheimer, Misoprostol and Illegal Abortion in Fortaleza, Brazil, 341 LANCET 1261 (1993); Sarah H. Costa & Martin P. Vessey, Misoprostol and
Illegal Abortion in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 341 LANCET 1258 (1993); John M. Paxman,
Alberto Rizo, Laura Brown & Janie Benson, The Clandestine Epidemic: The Practice of
Unsafe Abortion in Latin America, 24 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 205.
28
O.S. Tang, K. Gemzell-Danielsson & P.C. Ho, Misoprostol: Pharmokinetic
Profiles, Effects on the Uterus and Side-Effects, 99 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS
S160, S160 (2007).
29
Id. at S163–65.
30
The major complication associated with misoprostol use in pregnancy termination
is uterine bleeding, which is easier to treat than uterine perforation and pelvic infections
associated with other clandestine methods. Margareth Arilha & Regina M. Barbosa,
Cytotec in Brazil: “At Least it Doesn’t Kill”, 1 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 41, 43 (1993);
Regina M. Barbosa & Margareth Arilha, The Brazilian Experience with Cytotec, 24
STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 236, 237 (1993) [hereinafter Barbosa & Arilha, The Brazilian Experience with Cytotec]; A. Faúndes, L.C. Santos, M. Carvalho & C. Gras, Post-Abortion
Complications After Interruption of Pregnancy with Misoprostol, 12 ADVANCES IN CONTRACEPTION 1, 2 (1996); Suellen Miller, Tara Lehman, Martha Campbell, Anke Hemmerling, Sonia Brito Anderson, Hector Rodriguez, Wilme Vargas Gonzalez, Milton
Cordero & Victor Calderon, Misoprostol and Declining Abortion-Related Morbidity in
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: A Temporal Association, 112 BJOG: INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1291, 1292 (2005); Enrique D. Siña, Reducción de la
Mortalidad Maternal en Chile de 1990 a 2000, 15 REVISTA PANAMERICANA DE SALUD
PUBLICA 326, 329 (2004); Susheela Singh, Hospital Admissions Resulting from Unsafe
Abortion: Estimates from 13 Developing Countries, 368 LANCET 1887, 1890 (2006). Increased post-abortion hospital admissions have been reported in some cases. Women
may, however, report to hospitals as part of the “normal” process. They are instructed to
or arrive at the emergency room once bleeding and contractions begin for treatment of
spontaneous miscarriage as a means to complete the termination. The use of misoprostol
has thus been described as a “passport” for obtaining abortion completion services.
27
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abortion regimens have been studied in developing regions, and there is
much information and instruction available on their safe and effective use in
controlled settings.31 Women, however, lack access to this information.32
Misoprostol use in the clandestine practice of abortion has largely developed
on a trial and error basis.33 Studies reveal that women self-administer the
drug with little knowledge about the mechanism of action, dosage and routes
of administration, the process and its completion, and side effects.34 To realize the full potential of misoprostol to reduce abortion-related death and disClark et al., supra note 27, at 73; Henry Espinoza, Katrina Abuabara & Charlotte Ellerston, Physicians’ Knowledge and Opinions About Medication Abortion in Four Latin
American and Caribbean Region Countries, 70 CONTRACEPTION 127, 130 (2004); C.C.
Harper, K. Blanchard, D. Grossman, J.T. Henderson & P.D. Darney, Reducing Maternal
Mortality Due to Elective Abortion: Potential Impact of Misoprostol in Low-Resource
Settings, 98 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 66, 68 (2007) (providing estimates of
mortality reductions if misoprostol were to replace riskier techniques).
31
Deborah L. Billings, Misoprostol Alone for Early Medical Abortion in a Latin
American Clinic Setting, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS S57, S60 (2004). A consensus
regimen has been published for abortion through nine weeks gestation, consisting of 800
mcg vaginal misoprostol, repeated after twenty-four hours. GYNUITY HEALTH PROJECTS
& REPROD. HEALTH TECHS. PROJECT, CONSENSUS STATEMENT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE—
ABORTION INDUCTION WITH MISOPROSTOL IN PREGNANCIES UP TO 9 WEEKS LMP, at 2
(July 28, 2003), available at http://www.rhtp.org/news/publications/documents/Miso%20
for%20Pregnancy%20Termination.IFU.English.pdf.
32
Sherris et al., supra note 27, at 78–79; see also Espinoza, Abuabara & Ellerston,
supra note 30, at 132 (“Information was the only characteristic of medication abortion
that was seen solely as a disadvantage. . . . [M]any respondents noted a paucity of information for both physicians and women.”). Moreover, little research has been conducted
on the safety and effectiveness of misoprostol use in less controlled settings. Harper et
al., supra note 30, at 68; see also Clark et al., supra note 27, at 66.
33
See generally Kelly Blanchard, Beverly Winikoff & Charlotte Ellertson, Misoprostol Used Alone for the Termination of Early Pregnancy: A Review of the Evidence, 59
CONTRACEPTION 209 (1999) (reviewing available studies on the use of misoprostol for
early pregnancy termination).
34
Sherris et al., supra note 27, at 78–79:
Many women were aware of the availability of a “pill” that causes abortion, but
they often were unable to recall the name and were confused about the distinction
between misoprostol, emergency contraceptive pills, mifepristone, and oral
contraceptives. . . .
....
Women who had terminated a pregnancy described the process as one in which
they lacked . . . information. . . . Although the women generally recognized that
earlier abortions were safer and less difficult, their efforts often were delayed by
seeking information and trying various options.
Most women reported that they had received little information about misoprostol and widely varying instructions for use and would have appreciated having
better information. Although pharmacy staff provided some information about
symptoms that might occur after taking the tablets (such as bleeding and severe
cramps), many women had been unable to determine whether their symptoms
were abnormal or whether a complete abortion had occurred. . . .
It is important to note that these results reflect information from a small group
of women who sought postabortion care and does not include the experiences of
other women who used misoprostol but did not seek medical attention.
See also Tang, Gemzell-Danielsson & Ho, supra note 28, at S165 (describing that many
of the experienced effects of misoprostol are related to the abortion itself and include
abdominal pain, cramping, and bleeding, while other common side effects include nau-
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ability—to make unsafe abortion safer—the challenge is how to reach
women with safer-use information in restrictive legal environments.35
In answer to this challenge, a study undertaken in an undisclosed Latin
American country revealed a strong consensus that “physicians were the
most appropriate channel for providing women with instructions on misoprostol use.”36 The study further identified verbal communication through
physician-patient consultation as the best method to convey information.37
This Article examines one model of access to safer-use information through
patient-physician consultation: Health Initiatives Against Unsafe Abortion
(“the Uruguay Model”).
Similar to most countries in Latin America, the Penal Code in Uruguay
prohibits abortion as a crime but allows for the lessening or exemption of
punishment in mitigating circumstances: family honor, rape, severe economic hardship, and risk to maternal health or life.38 These circumstances
are referred to as the legal indications for abortion. They are strictly interpreted and rarely applied, with few abortions performed lawfully in the
country.39 Abortion nevertheless remains widespread, with clandestine abortion a leading cause of maternal death and disability.40
The objective of the Uruguay Model is to reduce the risk and harms of
unsafe abortion through the provision of health information and services.
The model consists of two interventions: a pre- and post-consultation, corresponding to the before and after of pregnancy termination.41
In the pre-consultation (the “before visit”), a woman who presents with
an unwanted pregnancy is offered the following information and services:
• A medical examination to confirm pregnancy and gestational age and,
more generally, to inform the woman about her health status (i.e., maternal or embryonic pathologies).
• Information on the Penal Code and whether she is lawfully entitled to
a pregnancy termination under its provisions. If so, abortion services
sea, vomiting, diarrhea, fever, chills, headache, and dizziness and appear to be doserelated and more frequent with oral regimens).
35
Sherris et al., supra note 27, at 80:
An important question that emerged from the data was how to inform and counsel
women about the use of misoprostol for pregnancy termination. Physicians and
pharmacists stated they were hesitant to provide such information because of the
restricted status of abortion in their countries and the controversy surrounding
misoprostol use, yet women expressed a desire for better information about misoprostol as an option for pregnancy termination.
36
Jessica Cohen, Olivia Ortiz, Silvia Elena Llaguno, Lorelei Goodyear, Deborah
Billings & Imelda Martinez, Reaching Women with Instructions on Misoprostol Use in a
Latin American Country, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 84, 86 (2005).
37
Id. at 88.
38
´
´ . PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] Ley 9.763, art. 1 (Uru.).
CODIGO
PENAL [COD
39
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 78.
40
Briozzo et al., Unsafe Abortion, supra note 2, at 71.
41
This summary description of the initiative is based on the literature cited supra
note 2.
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can be provided upon her request. If not, abortion services are not
provided.
• Evidence-based information on the risks of different methods of clandestine abortion, including safer self-induced methods, such as misoprostol use. This information includes the legal status of the drug, as
well as dose, routes, symptoms, side effects, mechanism of action, effectiveness, and problems of use at later gestational ages. No information is provided on where or how to obtain misoprostol, nor is the drug
prescribed by the attending physician.
• Non-directive counseling to discuss decision-making about continuing
or terminating the pregnancy. Information is provided about available
social support should the woman continue the pregnancy or adoption
as an alternative. The purpose of this information is to inform rather
than influence decision-making.
If the woman decides to terminate her pregnancy, she is encouraged to return
for follow-up care. In the post-consultation, she receives the following information and services:
• A medical examination to confirm complete termination and followup care for complications or incomplete abortion as required.
• Information about contraceptive options to avoid future unwanted
pregnancy, and contraceptive services as requested.
Patient-provider confidentiality is protected and assured to women in both
consultations.
The Uruguay Model was first implemented as a pilot project in the Pereira Rossell Hospital, Montevideo, the main public maternity hospital in the
country.42 In 2004, the Health Ministry enacted a regulation to implement
the model in all public sector facilities and to establish guidelines for preand post-consultation.43 The ministerial regulation was subsequently affirmed in law.44 The Uruguay Model does not merely provide safer-use information. The information is provided lawfully with full sanction of the
state.
In this Article, the Uruguay Model is used as an analytical tool to explore harm reduction and human rights as conceptual approaches to and discourses about unsafe abortion. The model is not considered synonymous
with a harm reduction or human rights approach. It is not treated as an ideal
model, but rather an actualized model or prototype of access to information
through physician-patient consultation in a restrictive legal environment.
42

Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 222.
On August 6, 2004, the Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Uruguay
issued Ordinance 369/04. Included in the appendix of the Ordinance are guidelines for
the Uruguay Model, entitled “Health Care Rules: Protective Measures for Mothers Faced
with Abortion Induced in Risky Conditions.” See also Round Up: Law and Policy, 15
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 208, 211 (2007).
44
´
´ . CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] Ley 18.426, Capı́tulo I, art. 4(b)(2)
CODIGO
CIVIL [COD
(Uru.).
43
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While the model and the Uruguayan legal context provide concreteness, the
analysis is intended to extend beyond them. The model is also not studied as
a practice. The description of the initiative does not account for what happens in any clinical setting. Rather, the description is limited to the objectives and design of the model as detailed in published literature. The extent
to which these reflect or deviate from the concepts of harm reduction and
human rights is used analytically to explore the relationship between them.
II. HARM REDUCTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AS CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORKS AND DISCOURSES
Most of the literature on harm reduction and human rights is written in
the drug use context.45 More than ten years ago, a warning was issued on the
ground lost and the opportunities missed by failing to see the intersections
between drug use and abortion.46 This Article pays heed.
The Uruguay Model is an opportune case study for thinking about harm
reduction and human rights in the context of unsafe abortion. The model is
expressly characterized as a harm reduction initiative, and was inspired by
the experience of HIV/AIDS prevention programs in the drug use context.47
Harm reduction is a rich but vague concept with no authoritative definition
of the term.48 There is nonetheless broad agreement as to its core content.49
45
Harm reduction as a concept and discourse came into development in the 1960s
and 70s to describe interventions in illicit drug use other than criminal prohibition to
prevent infection and overdose. In the mid-1980s, these alternatives became more widespread in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and were collectively referred to as “harm
reduction.” Access to safer-use information is an important harm reduction intervention
in the drug use context (e.g., information on the use of sterile injecting equipment). See
ALEX WODAK & ANNIE COONEY, WORLD HEALTH ORG., EFFECTIVENESS OF STERILE NEEDLE AND SYRINGE PROGRAMMING IN REDUCING HIV/AIDS AMONG INJECTING DRUG
USERS 17 (2004).
46
Lynn Paltrow, The War on Drugs and the War on Abortion: Some Initial Thoughts
on the Connections, Intersections and the Effects, 28 S.U. L. REV. 201, 202 (2001).
47
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 222.
48
Many efforts to define harm reduction can be found in the literature. See Simon
Lenton & Eric Single, The Definition of Harm Reduction, 17 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV.
213, 213–19 (1998); R. Newcombe, The Reduction of Drug Related-Harm: A Conceptual
Framework for Theory, Practice and Research, in THE REDUCTION OF DRUG-RELATED
HARM 1 (P.A. O’Hare, R. Newcombe, A. Matthews, E.C. Buning & E. Drucker eds.,
1992); Diane Riley, Ed Sawka, Peter Conley, David Hewitt, Wayne Mitic, Christiane
Poulin, Robin Room, Eric Single & John Topp, Harm Reduction: Concept and Practice—A Policy Discussion Paper, 34 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 9, 10–11 (1999); see
also Harm Reduction Defined, UK HARM REDUCTION ALLIANCE, http://www.ukhra.org/
harm_reduction_definition.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). For a discussion on the challenge of defining harm reduction, see Alex Wodak, Editorial, What is this Thing Called
Harm Reduction?, 10 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 169, 169 (1999).
49
See Diane Riley & Pat O’Hare, Harm Reduction: History, Definition, and Practice,
in HARM REDUCTION: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 6 (James A. Inciardi & Lana D. Harrison eds., 2000); see generally Tuukka Tammi & Toivo Hurme,
Commentary, How the Harm Reduction Movement Contrasts Itself Against Punitive Prohibition, 18 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 84 (2007) (deriving four theses of harm reduction based
on the founding texts of the movement).
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Harm reduction captures policies, programs, and practices that seek to reduce harms associated with an activity without requiring prohibition of the
activity itself. Three core principles can be further elaborated: neutrality,
humanism, and pragmatism.
The neutrality principle refers to non-judgment of the underlying activity. Harm reduction concerns only the risks and health-related harms of an
activity, not whether the activity is normatively right or wrong. To say that
harm reduction is value-neutral is not to say that it is value-free. The humanistic principle extends neutrality and the reservation of judgment beyond
the activity to the individuals who engage in it. Regardless of imputed
moral status or deviance from legal norms, all individuals are treated with
respect and deserving of concern for their health and lives. The pragmatic
principle has two dimensions. First, harm reduction is pragmatic in its acceptance that individuals will engage in the activity despite its legal prohibition; eradication is considered unrealistic if not impossible. Second, harm
reduction is pragmatic in its assessment of interventions, favoring consequentialist evidenced-based assessment (i.e., cost-benefit efficiency or
means-ends effectiveness).
Harm reduction is not the exclusive discourse around the Uruguay
Model. Literature promoting the initiative describes the model as a rightsbased initiative or human rights approach to unsafe abortion.50 With a diverse range of actors increasingly linking human rights to health-related
work, the term has ceased to have any one clear definition.51 A human rights
approach has come to characterize a range of approaches.
This Article uses the term human rights in two distinct ways. First, the
term human rights is used to describe a mode of legal argument for government responsibility both to alter the conditions that create or exacerbate risk
of health-related harm and to provide information and services necessary to
promote health.52 Second, the term is used to describe the application of
human rights principles and norms, such as participation and acceptability,
in assessment of the objectives and design of public health interventions.53
Consideration of human rights in the latter sense is intended to ensure that
“attention is given not only to the outcomes of health interventions, but also
to the ways they are implemented.” 54
With convergence-divergence as an organizing theme and using the
Uruguay Model as an analytical tool, this Article seeks to explore the rela-

50
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 35; Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 223; Carino et al., supra note 2, at 79.
51
Gruskin, supra note 10, at 6; Sophia Gruskin, Edward J. Mills & Daniel Tarantola,
History, Principles and Practice of Health and Human Rights, 370 LANCET 449, 452
(2007).
52
Gruskin, supra note 10, at 7–8; Gruskin, Mills & Tarantola, supra note 51, at
450–51.
53
Gruskin, supra note 10, at 9; Gruskin, Mills & Tarantola, supra note 51, at 452.
54
Gruskin, Mills & Tarantola, supra note 51, at 453.
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tionship between harm reduction and human rights as conceptual approaches
to and discourses about unsafe abortion. Given that the approaches reflect
core principles of one another, this Article is structured in three parts, corresponding to the principles of neutrality, humanism, and pragmatism.
III. THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE
The neutrality principle refers to non-judgment of the underlying activity. Harm reduction concerns the risks and harms of an activity, not whether
the activity is normatively right or wrong. Abortion itself is thus not the
problem to be solved. The Uruguay Model seeks to reduce the risk of death
and disability related to abortion, regardless of its moral or legal status.55
Unsafe abortion is identified not as a criminal offense but as a contributor to
maternal death. A retrospective study in Uruguay revealed that unsafe abortion was the leading single contributor to maternal death in the country from
1997 to 2001, especially for women among the lowest socioeconomic
strata.56
It is perhaps unsurprising that a health professional organization would
think of abortion in health-related terms and initiate a harm reduction program. Other than the women involved, health professionals encounter the
harms of unsafe abortion most directly. The legal status of the abortion is
medically irrelevant to survival from uterine perforation, hemorrhage, and
sepsis. In post-abortion care, from the perspective of the health professional,
only the fact of death matters.
The Uruguay Model follows a strong international trend in this regard.
It draws support from the terms of the 1994 UN International Conference on
Population and Development and its Programme of Action, which calls on
governments “to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion as a major
public health concern . . . .”57 The Programme further states that “[w]omen
who have unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to reliable information and compassionate counseling.”58 The Uruguay Model is offered as
a means for government to act on these commitments.59 It is also a means to
act on unsafe abortion without engaging the law on abortion. The Uruguay

55
See generally Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2 (describing the
Uruguay Model’s objectives and its approach to abortion); Briozzo et al., Iniciativas
Sanitarias, supra note 2 (explaining the philosophy of the Uruguay model).
56
Briozzo et al., Unsafe Abortion, supra note 2, at 70.
57
International Conference on Population and Development (“ICPD”), Cairo, Egypt,
Sept. 5–13, 1994, United Nations Programme of Action of the International Conference
on Population and Development, ¶ 8.25, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994). Unsafe abortion as a major public health concern was recognized long before the ICPD
addressed it: both by the World Health Assembly in 1967 and at the Safe Motherhood
Conference in 1987. World Health Assembly Res. WHA20.41 (May 1967); Susan A.
Cohen, The Safe Motherhood Conference, 13 INT’L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 68, 68 (1987).
58
ICPD, supra note 57, ¶ 8.25.
59
Faúndes et al., supra note 2, at 165–66.
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Model “may be implemented in any country irrespective of current legislation . . . . Its application in many other contexts is a question of political
will.”60
This shift from crime to health in the definition of abortion reflects the
sociological process of medicalization. The term—literally, to “make medical”—refers to the process by which social problems come to be defined
and thus addressed as medical or more broadly health problems.61 This definitional process happens at both conceptual and institutional levels.62 At a
conceptual level, the problem itself is characterized in health-related terms
and concepts; for example, abortion is a major public health concern defined
by mortality and morbidity statistics. At an institutional level, the solution
to the problem is found in public health interventions—information and
counseling rather than prohibition and penalty—and the responsibility for
these interventions falls to health professionals, institutions, and authorities.
In the Uruguay Model, health professionals are described as having both the
capacity and the responsibility to reduce the harm of unsafe abortion.63 State
action, including law and regulation, is advocated to protect these actors and
to implement the model system-wide.64
Sophisticated commentary on medicalization admits to its complicated
mix of advantage and disadvantage.65 One advantage is the value-neutrality
of a health discourse. Rather than deprived of values, the discourse is experienced as neutral because the values it “expresses and promotes . . . are so
widely accepted that they are not subject to debate. Instead they tend to be
regarded as objective ‘goods’, for example, the protection and promotion of
public health . . . .”66 Harm reduction for this reason is regarded as a “pow-

60

Id. at 166.
Peter Conrad, Medicalization and Social Control, 18 ANN. REV. SOC. 209, 210
(1992); see generally IRVING KENNETH ZOLA, SOCIO-MEDICAL INQUIRIES: RECOLLECTIONS, REFLECTIONS, AND RECONSIDERATIONS (1983) (discussing socio-medical research
and the sociological process of medicalization).
62
Conrad, supra note 61, at 211; see generally Peter Conrad & Joseph W. Schneider,
Looking at Levels of Medicalization: A Comment on Strong’s Critique of the Thesis of
Medical Imperialism, 14 SOC. SCI. & MED. 75 (1980) (disagreeing with a narrow view of
medicalization, and arguing that medicalization occurs not only on the level of doctorpatient interactions, but also on conceptual and institutional levels).
63
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 79.
64
Id. at 80–81.
65
See, e.g., Kathryn Pauly Morgan, Contested Bodies, Contested Knowledges: Women, Health, and the Politics of Medicalization, in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S HEALTH:
EXPLORING AGENCY AND AUTONOMY 83, 97–98 (Susan Sherwin ed., 1998); see generally
PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS (1980) (investigating the origins and contemporary consequences of
the medicalization of deviance); KAREN B. LEVY, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S HEALTH
CARE: MEDICALIZATION AS A FORM OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1992) (discussing the process
of medicalization in women’s reproductive health); see infra notes 183–208 and accompanying text (describing further advantages and the disadvantages of medicalization).
66
Helen Keane, Critiques of Harm Reduction, Morality and the Promise of Human
Rights, 14 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 227, 228 (2003).
61
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erful rhetorical intervention in . . . highly moralised landscape[s].”67 Consensus can be found amidst the ideological conflict of abortion, allowing for
progressive action to protect life and health. Medicalization, particularly the
shift from crime to health, thus accounts for the strength of harm reduction
as a public discourse. With its focus on public health harms and its rational
claims to a normatively neutral, pragmatic approach, harm reduction can
bring together disparate political and other actors, maximize the appeal of an
intervention, and afford political legitimacy to action on an otherwise controversial issue.68 Asked in a founding text of the harm reduction movement: “[w]ho, in their right mind, could oppose the notion of reducing
harm?”69
The shift from crime to health also proves an advantage in constructing
a normative validation for harm reduction in international human rights law.
The value-neutrality of the discourse does not mean that harm reduction is
value-free. Taking a non-judgmental stance on the need to reduce abortionrelated mortality and morbidity, whatever the state of the law, is a valuebased position.70 Medicalization or an emphasis on health-related harms is a
crucial step in the redefinition of unsafe abortion as a human rights issue. A
human rights approach shifts the understanding of unsafe abortion from a
mere misfortune to an injustice that states can and are obligated to remedy.71
A. State Responsibility for the Harms of Unsafe Abortion
The move from harm to state responsibility proceeds by very different
rationales under human rights and harm reduction approaches. In simple but
apt terms: one can “bite the hand of government that promotes a policy of
harm maximization” or shake the benign hand of government that “proffers
. . . resources for harm reduction services.”72 Under the doctrine of state
responsibility in international law, states are held accountable if a causal
connection can be drawn between the harm and a state act or omission that

67

Id. at 227.
Reinarman, supra note 12, at 239; Hunt, supra note 13, at 233.
69
Ethan A. Nadelmann, Progressive Legalizers, Progressive Prohibitionists and the
Reduction of Drug-Related Harm, in Psychoactive Drugs and Harm Reduction: From
Faith to Science 34, 37 (Nick Heather et al. eds., 1993).
70
Keane, supra note 66, at 228; see generally Craig L. Fry, Kaveh Khoshnood, Robert Power & Mukta Sharma, Editorial, Harm Reduction Ethics: Acknowledging the Values
and Beliefs Behind Our Actions, 19 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 1 (2008) (reviewing several
papers on harm reduction ethics); Bernadette Pauly, Harm Reduction Through a Social
Justice Lens, 19 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 4 (2008) (analyzing the underlying values of harm
reduction as a basis for social action).
71
Rebecca J. Cook, Advancing Safe Motherhood Through Human Rights, in GIVING
MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 109, 110 (Isfahan Merali &
Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2001).
72
Danny Kushlick & Steve Rolles, Response, Human Rights Versus Political Capital, 15 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 245, 245 (2004).
68
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constitutes a breach of an international obligation.73 This breach entails legal
consequences, including new remedial obligations of prevention. Responsibility is thus always tied to causation in a human rights analysis. The same
is not true in harm reduction. Reflecting the neutrality principle, a general
avoidance of judgment or blame, there is a dislocation of responsibility. In
harm reduction, the risk and harm of unsafe abortion can be conceptualized
as having a simple, objective, factual existence. The focus is the harm not
its cause. Responsibility on the state thus derives largely from a capacity to
act to remedy the harm rather than an obligation to act as the cause of it.
Responsibility in international human rights law, in contrast, carries the latter meaning. A rights-based approach may prove crucial in cases where risk
and harm fall disproportionately on stigmatized communities, whose healthrelated needs even when identified are marginalized or neglected. Human
rights can respond to those for whom public health evidence alone provides
no incentive to act.74
While state obligations to reduce the harms of unsafe abortion can be a
powerful public discourse, analytical effort is required to trigger these remedial obligations: a causal connection must be drawn between the harm and
state action, and the state action must be demonstrated to breach international obligations.
A public health perspective has proven instrumental in the drawing of a
causal connection between the harms of unsafe abortion and the state.75
State responsibility is invoked not with respect to any one incident of unsafe
abortion, but from its contribution to death and disability in population
terms.76 The international human rights jurisprudence reveals a preoccupa73
Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women’s Human Rights, 7
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 127 (1994) (citing SHABTAI ROSENNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION’S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1991)).
74
See, e.g., Jürgens et al., supra note 9, at 482:
Some experts advocate for discussion of drug use mainly in the language and data
of public health as an alternative to criminal prohibition. Some gains have been
achieved through such a strategy; however, the pursuit of human rights along with
public health is crucial. Without a fundamental challenge to the barriers blocking
humane, rational drug policy, short-term public health advances will not be sustainable in the long term.
See also Cohen & Wolfe, Commentary, supra note 9, at S94 (“Although demonstrated
to be effective, harm reduction measures face extensive legal and administrative restrictions . . . .”).
75
See REBECCA J. COOK, BERNARD M. DICKENS & MAHMOUD F. FATHALLA, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTEGRATING MEDICINE, ETHICS, AND LAW
222–24 (2003) (internal citations omitted):
Documentation of alleged violations of legal and human rights is a necessary
step in holding governments and other institutions and officers accountable. . . .
....
Evidence of high rates of abortion, for example, can be used to require governments and other institutional or private agencies to explain why they are not effectively providing contraceptive services, including emergency contraception.
76
Id. at 223–24.
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tion with abortion as a major cause of death.77 Ministries of Health are
called upon to undertake thorough investigations of the impact of unsafe
abortion on women’s health and lives.78 There are advantages and disadvantages to event- or standard-based data in human rights analysis.79 A disadvantage of statistical presentation is that it can too easily become a
depersonalizing and alienating perspective, disguising the human side of unsafe abortion and losing sight of the women themselves.80 Then again, women are too often the sole focus of abortion under a prohibitionist approach.
Pregnancy termination is treated as an individual pathology—personal inadequacy or indulgence is described as the cause of clandestine abortion, moral
weakness or failure the cause of the harm suffered. Unsafe abortion is then
defined as an individual rather than collective problem.
The advantage of abstracting from the individual is to complicate and
contextualize causation—to understand why women come to be exposed to
risk or protective factors in unsafe abortion, what circumstances shape women’s exposure to the harms of unsafe abortion.81 The analytical task is to
source the harms of unsafe abortion in a variety of causes, preventable by
different actors. “Causes may be identified by reference to different time
frames, ranging from the immediate precipitating cause of an injury . . . to
long-standing socio-cultural practices . . . .”82 Causes may also be attributed
to different actors, from the individual to the state. Regardless of contextualization method, the cause of the harm is located beyond the practice of
unsafe abortion by an individual woman. She is no longer the sole actor
involved, and thus responsibility to avoid harm no longer resides solely with
her. The burden of responsibility is shifted away from the individual woman

77
See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Brazil, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/BRA/CO/2 (June 12, 2009) [hereinafter CESCR Concluding Observation: Brazil]; Human Rights Comm. (“HRC”), Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Chile, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5 (May 18, 2007) [hereinafter HRC
Concluding Observations: Chile]; HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Madagascar, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MDG/CO/3 (May 11, 2007); HRC,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Honduras, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/HND/CO/1 (Dec. 13, 2006); HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Paraguay, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/PRY/CO/2 (Apr. 24, 2006).
78
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Panama, ¶ 43, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/PAN/CO/7 (Feb. 5, 2010); see also CEDAW,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Tuvalu, ¶ 44, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/TUV/CO/2 (Aug. 7, 2010).
79
Lynn P. Freedman, Censorship and Manipulation of Reproductive Health Information: An Issue of Human Rights and Women’s Health, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION, supra note 18, at 1–2.
80
Peter G. Miller, A Critical Review of the Harm Minimization Ideology in Australia,
11 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 167, 173 (2001).
81
Freedman, supra note 79, at 2; see infra notes 253–65 and accompanying text
(describing the relationship between vulnerability reduction and human rights).
82
COOK, DICKENS & FATHALLA, supra note 75, at 222.
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toward other members of society with the capacity, if not the obligation, to
act.83
Studies that reveal high maternal mortality and morbidity rates, for example, are interpreted as “provid[ing] an important indication for States
parties of possible breaches of their duties to ensure women’s access to
health care.”84 Why do high maternal mortality and morbidity rates indicate
possible breaches of state obligations? What is the causal link between unsafe abortion and the state? It is the omission or failure to act that constitutes the breach.85 A state is legally bound to do more than nothing in the
face of known and avoidable suffering and death. “This obligation inheres
in the term ‘right.’” 86
“[R]ights talk” . . . asserts that concern for the welfare of those
who are excluded and marginalized is not simply a matter of charitable humanitarianism. Rather, it establishes . . . rights-bearers,
whose rights are disrespected through the deliberate application of
policies known to produce avoidable suffering and death, and who
have a moral and legal claim to the means of promoting and protecting their health.87
Human rights provide an entitlement to avoid premature death and preventable suffering, and to the means necessary to protect and promote life and
health. This entitlement entails correlative obligations on the state, such that
mere omission constitutes a breach. For this reason, the failure to reduce
maternal mortality rates—without further qualification—is interpreted as a
breach of state obligations.88 The same is true with respect to abortion-re83
See generally Bruce G. Link & Jo Phelan, Social Conditions as Fundamental
Causes of Disease, 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 80 (1995) (discussing the shifting
burden of responsibility in a “social determinants of health” approach); Lynn P. Freedman, Human Rights and the Politics of Risk and Blame: Lessons from the International
Reproductive Health Movement, 54 J. AM. MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N 165 (1997) (arguing
that new understandings of the effect of socioeconomic conditions on poor health will
only generate change when they are reframed into political claims).
84
CEDAW, General Recommendation 24: Women and Health, (Article 12) 20th
Sess., Jan. 19–Feb. 5, 1999, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp No.
38 (1999) [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24]; see also Cook, supra
note 73, at 150 (describing the use of standards and statistics as evidence of breaches of
state obligations).
85
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), General Comment 14:
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12), ¶¶ 49, 51, UN Doc.
HRI/GEN/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (2000) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 14]; see
also Cook, supra note 73, at 149 (describing the concept of state responsibility as extending to the passive failure to meet positive obligations).
86
Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REV. 1, 34
(1994).
87
Elliot et al., supra note 8, at 124.
88
See CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 52; CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 17; see also UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
on Preventable Maternal Mortality and Morbidity and Human Rights, ¶¶ 8, 61, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/39 (Apr. 16, 2010) (characterizing preventable maternal mortality and

R

R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\34-2\HLG202.txt

430

unknown

Seq: 18

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

13-JUN-11

8:03

[Vol. 34

lated death and disability. The status quo of unsafe abortion and its harms
constitute a legally cognizable wrong, triggering state responsibility and requiring remedial action.
State responsibility based on the failure to act is explicit in the interpretation of unsafe abortion as a form of violence against women and as a
human rights violation on this basis.89 This interpretation is more common
in Latin America than other regions, likely due to the strong articulation and
application of violence against women as a human rights concept in the Inter-American system.90 Violence against women is defined as acts or conduct based on gender, that is, directed against a woman because she is a
woman or that affect women disproportionately, and which cause death or
physical, psychological, or sexual harm or suffering.91 The fact that only
women engage in unsafe abortion and are thus uniquely subject to its risks
and harms formally qualifies the practice as violence against women under
this definition. In the case González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that state failure to investigate
and prevent violence against women violates the rights to life, humane treatment, and personal liberty.92 State accountability arises where violence “has
occurred with the support or the acquiescence of the government, or
[where] the State has allowed the act to take place without taking measures
to prevent it.”93
Unsafe abortion can thus be interpreted as a human rights violation
where the state is aware of the pattern of unsafe abortion and its healthrelated harms, but fails to adopt measures for its prevention. Authoritative
interpretations in international human rights law reflect this reasoning. Violations of the right to health can occur through omission to take measures
arising from legal obligations, such as the failure to discourage or otherwise
protect against practices harmful to health.94 The state is obligated to undermorbidity as a human rights violation, citing to the work of UN treaty monitoring bodies
among other authorities).
89
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,
Report Addendum: Policies and Practices that Impact Women’s Reproductive Rights and
Contribute to, Cause or Constitute Violence Against Women, Comm’n on Human Rights,
¶ 45, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.4 (Jan. 21, 1999) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy).
90
The Inter-American System has a dedicated regional treaty on the subject. InterAmerican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women (“Convention of Belem do Para”), June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (entered into
force Mar. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Convention of Belem do Para]; see also Anibal Faúndes,
Maria José de Oliveira Araújo, Jorge Andalaft Neto, Maria de Fátima & Oliveira Ferreira,
Final Report: IX Fórum Interprofessional: Unsafe Abortion as a Form of Violence
Against Women, 32 FEMINA 877 (2004) (discussing how women’s sexual and reproductive rights can be advanced in Brazil).
91
Convention of Belem do Para, supra note 90, at 1535; CEDAW, General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, 11th Sess., ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/47/38; GAOR,
47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993) [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19].
92
González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 205, ¶¶ 249–86 (Nov. 16, 2009).
93
Id. ¶ 236.
94
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶¶ 49, 51.
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take “legislative and other measures . . . to protect women from the effects
of clandestine and unsafe abortions and to ensure that women do not resort
to such harmful procedures.”95 Under the right to life, the state is similarly
asked to report on “any measures [undertaken] . . . to ensure [women] do
not have to undergo life-threatening clandestine abortions.”96 Where unsafe
abortion disproportionately impacts the lives and health of women from socially disadvantaged or vulnerable groups or communities, failure to reduce
abortion-related harm may constitute a separate breach of the legal obligation of non-discrimination.97
B. State Obligations to Reduce the Harms of Unsafe Abortion
State accountability for human rights violations entails legal consequences; in particular, new remedial obligations of prevention arise. The
human rights to life, health, and non-discrimination obligate the state to
act—to adopt measures to protect women from the risks of unsafe abortion
and to ensure women need not resort to harmful procedures.
The State enjoys discretion in determining the measures by which it
will comply with its international obligations, given that the most appropriate measure may vary from one state to another.98 This discretion, however,
95
CESCR Concluding Observation: Brazil, supra note 77, ¶ 29. In a series of Concluding Observations, the CESCR identified maternal mortality due to unsafe abortion as
requiring government action. See, e.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Cambodia, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/
KHM/CO/1 (June 12, 2009); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Philippines, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/PHL/CO/4
(Dec. 1, 2008); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: Bolivia, ¶¶ 14(f), 27(f), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BOL/CO/2 (Aug. 8,
2008); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: El Salvador, ¶¶ 25, 44, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/SLV/CO/2 (June 27, 2007);
CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Mexico, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/4 (June 6, 2006).
96
HRC, General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women
(Article 3), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000) [hereinafter HRC
General Comment No. 28].
97
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 26; see also CEDAW,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Malawi, ¶¶ 36–37, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MWI/CO/6 (Feb. 5, 2010); CEDAW,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Timor-Leste, ¶¶ 37–38, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/TLS/CO/1 (Aug. 7, 2009);
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Cameroon, ¶¶ 40–41, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CMR/CO/3 (Feb. 10,
2009); CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Ecuador, ¶¶ 38–39, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ECU/CO/7 (Nov.
7, 2008); CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Nigeria, ¶¶ 336–37, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NGA/CO/6
(July 8, 2008); CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women: Bolivia, ¶¶ 42–43, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/4
(Apr. 8, 2008).
98
CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States’ Parties Obligations, ¶ 4, U.N.
Doc. E/1991/23 (1990) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 3]; see also CEDAW
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is not absolute. “Each State party must be able to justify the appropriateness
of the particular means it has chosen and to demonstrate whether it will
achieve the intended effect and result.”99
Harm reduction interventions can serve an important function in this
justificatory exercise. The Uruguay Model is an evidenced-based intervention to reduce abortion-related mortality and morbidity. The provision of
safer-use information through physician-patient consultation has proven effective: “[it] clearly prevented the use of dangerous means to induce abortion, such as the introduction of sharp, unsterile [sic] objects into the
pregnant uterus, toxic infusions, etc.”100 All of the women who returned for
the “after visit” carried out their abortion with misoprostol.101 “The fact that
the rate of complications was minimal among the women participating in the
program and that not a single death after abortion has occurred since the
program started is suggestive, but not conclusive [that the strategy is
working].”102
The effectiveness of harm reduction to protect life and health is a background fact against which the state must justify the appropriateness of its
measures to reduce abortion-related harm.103 This will prove a difficult task
to the extent the state impedes or otherwise neglects harm reduction. While
human rights law does not explicitly require the state to adopt harm reduction interventions in unsafe abortion, this may be the de facto result of an
assessment of appropriate measures. The direct and immediate link between
General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article
2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
¶ 23, U.N. Doc. C/2010/47/GC.2 (2010) [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation
No. 28].
99
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 98, ¶ 23; see also CESCR,
General Comment No. 3, supra note 98, ¶ 4.
100
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 225.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 226.
103
Comparative data may be relevant in the justificatory exercise. The appropriateness of state action, for example, may be assessed against harm reduction measures introduced in similarly situated jurisdictions that have endeavored to tackle the health-related
harms associated with drug use. See Malkin, Elliott & McRae, supra note 9, at 544
(“The establishment of SIFs [supervised injection facilities] in several jurisdictions
shows that it is possible to take this step toward realizing the right to health. . . .
[C]ountries such as Canada and the United States, with pronounced and escalating drug
crises, should be measured against similarly situated, relatively wealthy jurisdictions . . .
which have endeavored to tackle the problems associated with drug use by means of
introducing novel harm minimization measures . . . .”). Research in the drug use context
has also moved beyond demonstrating the effectiveness of existing measures. Mathematical modeling can estimate the future trajectory of the HIV epidemic and thus the reduction of harm if measures, such as opioid substitution and needle exchange, are
implemented. See generally Steffanie A. Strathdee, Timothy B. Hallett, Natalia Bobrova,
Tim Rhodes, Robert Booth, Reychad Abdool & Catherine A. Hankins, HIV and Risk
Environment for Injecting Drug Users: The Past, Present and Future, 376 LANCET 268
(2010) (modeling changes in risk environments in regions with severe HIV epidemics
associated with injecting drug use, and estimating significant reductions in these regions
upon the implementation of programs for opioid substitution, needle exchange, and antiretroviral therapy).
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harm reduction and the prevention of death and disability leads to state obligations specific to harm reduction as a remedial intervention.
The obligation to respect requires that the state refrain from interfering
with harm reduction measures,104 supporting the permissiveness of interventions such as the Uruguay Model. The right to health includes the right to
seek, receive, and impart information.105 Restraint by the state must therefore be exercised against both the recipient and provider of information. The
right to seek and receive information obligates the state to “refrain from
limiting access to . . . [the] means of maintaining sexual and reproductive
health, from censoring, withholding or intentionally misrepresenting healthrelated information.”106 The state must exercise restraint from “obstructing
action taken by women in pursuit of their health goals.”107
Neither may the state obstruct the provision of health-related information. The right to impart information was affirmed by the European Court of
Human Rights in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland.108 The
case concerned an injunction that prohibited counselors from providing information to women in Ireland about lawful abortion services in the U.K.109
The injunction was held in violation of the freedom to receive and impart
information.110 The injunction could not be justified in the public interest,
the Court reasoned, because of its adverse effects on women’s health and
well-being, namely delay leading to later-term abortion and denied access to
post-abortion care.111
The right to health is interpreted similarly in international law to protect
against restrictions on access to information that are “likely to result in bodily harm, unnecessary morbidity, and preventable mortality.”112 This includes restricted access as a consequence of de facto discrimination. In
Open Door, the European Court noted the discriminatory effects of the injunction on “women who were not sufficiently resourceful or had not the
necessary level of education to have access to alternative sources of informa-

104
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶¶ 34, 50; see also CEDAW
General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 14.
105
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 12(b).
106
Id. ¶ 34; CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 50.
107
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 14.
108
Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/88
& 14235/88, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244 (1992).
109
Id. at 259–60.
110
Id. at 261. It is unclear whether Article 10 of the European Convention implicitly
includes a right to access information. Peter Noorlander, The Right to Information on
Reproductive Health Under International Law, in TIME FOR CHANGE: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL HEALTH RIGHTS
IN PERU 22, 32 n.56 (Bethan Grillo & Louise Finer, ed., 2006) (“[T]he European Court
has held that the freedom of expression provision in the ECHR does not guarantee access
to information: Sirbu v. Moldova, 15 June 2004 (admissibility), Application no. 73562/
01.”).
111
Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 266–67.
112
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 50.
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tion.”113 The right to health specifically requires that information be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable or marginalized.114 The
implementation of the Uruguay Model in public health facilities is designed
to achieve this equalizing effect. Advocates of the model note that “[i]n
many countries, women with resources and education often access information about safer abortion methods . . . through the internet, an advantage that
poorer and more marginalised women are denied.”115 The Uruguay Model
allows all women regardless of social status to access life-saving
information.116
An important difference between Open Door and the Uruguay Model
must be noted. In the former case, information is provided on lawful abortion services as emphasized by the Court.117 In the latter, safer-use information is provided to women who do not qualify for a lawful abortion—the
abortions are not merely clandestine but unlawful. The literature on the Uruguay Model respects this distinction between lawful and unlawful abortion:
“see[ing] a patient before or after the abortion does not mean I am inducing
or collaborating with a crime, but that I am acting as my professional duty
obliges me to.”118 The reference to “professional duty” seeks refuge in the
medicalized discourse of harm reduction. Information is provided to reduce
risk and promote health, not to induce or counsel criminal activity.119 To
further distinguish between lawful and unlawful action, the act of informing
is set apart from prescribing or promoting.120 “Women were only provided
with the evidence-based information on misoprostol efficacy, risks, side effects, dosage and route of administration, the same way as it is done with all
other alternatives for abortion induction.”121 This statement seeks to render
information provision indistinguishable from the everyday activities of
health professionals. The information and counseling are also explicitly referred to as “neutral.”122 Pre-consultation is intended not to influence decision-making, but to provide full and non-directive information on all
alternatives.123
113

Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 267.
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 12(b).
115
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 79.
116
Id. at 77.
117
Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 266 (“The
injunction limited the freedom to receive and impart information with respect to services
which are lawful . . . and may be crucial to a woman’s health and well-being.”).
118
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 24.
119
SEE Lawrence O. Gostin & Zita Lazzarini, Prevention of HIV/AIDS Among Injection Drug Users: The Theory and Science of Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Disease Prevention, 46 EMORY L.J. 587, 686–89 (1997) (describing the
“necessity” defense in harm reduction in which physicians’ actions are justified as lawful
based on the “necessity” to avert greater public health harm).
120
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 81; Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra
note 2, at 226.
121
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 226.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 222–23.
114
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European case law suggests the distinction between information provision and other activities may be crucial to the permissibility of harm reduction in the abortion context. Ministry of Health guidelines on abortion were
held potentially unlawful by a court in Northern Ireland based on provisions
related to non-directive counseling.124 The guidelines described the purpose
of counseling “as offer[ing] support in a non-judgmental and non-directive
way to enable [women] to make an informed choice about termination or its
alternatives.”125 The guidelines did not, however, restrict counseling to lawful abortion. Rather, the Court held that the provision could be interpreted
as allowing counseling before a woman was advised her termination was
lawful, raising a number of legal questions: To what extent can a doctor
“advise a patient about the availability of abortion services . . . when under
[the] law an abortion could not be provided? Could the giving of such
advice constitute an offence of counseling or procuring an abortion . . . ? Is
the giving of such advice (in a neutral and non-directive way) lawful provided abortion is not being advocated or promoted?”126
These questions seek a clear distinction between information on and
promotion of abortion. This same distinction was emphasized in Open
Door. The European Court noted that the information provided was nondirective: “counselors neither advocated nor encouraged abortion, but confined themselves to an explanation of the available options” and that provision of such information would not inevitably result in pregnancy
termination.127 The literature on the Uruguay Model stresses the same finding. Some women decide not to seek an abortion after receiving information
and counseling.128 Evidence that information-provision does not necessarily
lead to abortion in an individual case, and has not or would not have a substantial impact on the numbers of abortions, seems crucial to distinguishing
the activity and establishing its permissiveness.129 Current interpretations of
international human rights law likely protect information provision when the
abortion is unlawful, but not counseling to undergo or provide an unlawful
abortion.130
An obligation to respect human rights—the mere permissiveness of
harm reduction—suffers a further limitation. This limitation can be explained by reference to a U.S. case on abortion-related information, Rust v.
Sullivan.131 The U.S. Supreme Court held that conditions on state funding,
effectively prohibiting provision of all-abortion related information, did not
124
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, Re Judicial Review, [2009] N.I.
92 (Q.B.), ¶ 33–38.
125
Id. ¶ 33.
126
Id. ¶ 37.
127
Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/88
& 14235/88, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244, 266 (1992).
128
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 225.
129
Coliver, supra note 18, at 65.
130
Id. at 40.
131
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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violate any information-related right.132 “The Government can . . . selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternate program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way.”133 Restriction by state subsidy was thus treated differently from restriction by direct regulation, such as
an injunction. The consequence, however, was the same. Women dependent
on public facilities for health services were denied access to information.
Such an impoverished interpretation of state accountability is countered
in international human rights law by a positive obligation to ensure effective
enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to fulfill requires the state to
take positive measures to promote life and health protection.134 Based on the
significant body of evidence regarding the effectiveness of harm reduction
interventions, the right to health has been interpreted as requiring the state to
implement these interventions.135 The implementation of harm reduction
measures is considered, in other words, necessary for the realization of the
right to health.136 The measures adopted by the state cannot be justified as
appropriate without harm reduction. A harm-reduction initiative is by definition a right-to-health initiative.137
The same holds true in the abortion context. The right to health can be
interpreted to require the enactment of precisely the kind of legal and regulatory measures supporting the Uruguay Model. The right to health guarantees
“access to appropriate health care services that will . . . enable women to go
safely through pregnancy.”138 Information is a health care service,139 and the
Uruguay Model demonstrates that safer-use information on clandestine abortion methods allows women to survive an unwanted pregnancy. The obliga132

Id. at 192–200.
Id. at 193.
134
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 37; Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment 6 (article 6), Annex V, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (Sept. 22, 1982).
135
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical
and Mental Health, Human Rights Council, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. A/65/255 (Aug. 6, 2010) (by
Anand Grover); see also CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Ukraine, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/UKR/CO/5 (Jan. 4,
2008); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Tajikistan, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/TJK/CO/1 (Nov. 24, 2006); Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, on his Mission to
Romania, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/51/Add.4 (Feb. 21,
2005) (by Paul Hunt).
136
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt,
on his Mission to Sweden, Human Rights Council, ¶ 60–62, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/28/
Add.2 (Feb. 28, 2007) (by Paul Hunt).
137
Jürgens et al., supra note 9, at 480.
138
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, n.12; see also Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 12(2), supra note 22;
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 27.
139
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶¶ 11, 36.
133
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tion to fulfill the right to health requires the state not simply to permit, but to
disseminate appropriate health-information on the main health problems in
the community and methods for their prevention.140 By definition this includes death and disability from unsafe abortion, and information as a
method to prevent these adverse consequences. Harm reduction is not
merely consistent with but required by international law. The objective “is
not to keep the state out of health programmes . . . [but to] encourage states
and other relevant actors to provide . . . reproductive health information in a
way that vindicates rights, health and the well-being of women and
society.”141
Before concluding this section, it is important to note that safer-use
information initiatives, such as the Uruguay Model, rely on availability of
the means for safer abortion, namely misoprostol. The initiative only works
if women can access the drug, and yet whether and how women obtain the
drug is at best a secondary consideration in the literature.142 This is most
likely a deliberate effort to distance lawful information provision from unlawful drug procurement. The registration and distribution of drugs, however, is also subject to state action. Misoprostol is not registered in Uruguay
for obstetric-gynecologic indications and, given high legal market prices,
access is believed to be largely restricted to the black market.143 In the early
1990s, the Ministry of Health in Brazil enacted regulations restricting sales
of misoprostol to curb its use for clandestine abortion.144 Similar restrictions
were enacted in Thailand, limiting the availability of the drug to prescription
in hospitals.145 While misoprostol will likely remain accessible in Uruguay
through the black market, state action restricting availability and impacting
quality and cost may violate international human rights law for reasons of
health-related harms. Harm reduction and human rights approaches may
thus support access to medicines in addition to information for safer
abortion.

140

Id. ¶¶ 16, 37, 44(d).
Freedman, supra note 79, at 23.
142
See, e.g., Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 226 (noting only
that “women adopted several different strategies” to obtain the drug).
143
Maria M. Fernandez, Francine Coeytaux, Rodolfo Gomez Ponce de León & Denise L. Harrison, Assessing the Global Availability of Misoprostol, 105 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 180, 185 (2009).
144
S.H. Costa, Commercial Availability of Misoprostol and Induced Abortion in Brazil, 63 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS S131, S133 (1998). The pharmaceutical
distributor supported these restrictions, entering into an agreement with the Ministry of
Health to reduce production. Barbosa & Arilha, The Brazilian Experience with Cytotec,
supra note 30, at 237.
145
Andrea Whittaker, The Struggle for Abortion Law Reform in Thailand, 10
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 45, 46 (2002).
141
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IV. THE HUMANISTIC PRINCIPLE
The neutrality of harm reduction extends beyond the activity of abortion to the women who engage it. Judgment is reserved. Regardless of imputed moral status or deviance from legal norms, all individuals are treated
as deserving of concern for their health and lives. This is the humanistic
principle of harm reduction, an “acceptance of the simple humanity of the
drug user, her connection to the rest of us.”146 Harm reduction is thus once
again not a value-free discourse. The Uruguay Model and other harm reduction interventions seek to counter stigmatization of the individual, a process
enacted in both the criminal justice and health systems. Health systems “are
not only producers of health or health care but . . . purveyors of a wider set
of societal values and norms.”147 More than technical interventions of health
information or services, harm reduction seeks to imbue the health system
with values of respect, worth, and dignity.148 Harm reduction and human
rights strongly converge on this principle. The humanism of harm reduction
corresponds to respect for the human rights of the individual.
A. Entitlement to Receive and Provide Health Information
In the Uruguay Model, women receive safer-use information when they
do not qualify for a lawful abortion.149 This feature may simply reflect the
focus on harm irrespective of legality. From a humanistic perspective, however, the irrelevance of legality reflects something more. A woman does not
forfeit her right to information by engaging in illegal activities.150 All women are treated as “citizens, with rights, who should be provided with
information.”151
Human rights are not revocable based on conduct. They inhere in the
individual and not in status or action. The right to life is explicitly interpreted to require state protection for the “life of all persons, including women whose pregnancies are terminated.”152 The right to health is violated
146
Scott Burris, Response, Harm Reduction’s First Principle: “The Opposite of Hatred,” 15 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 243, 243 (2004); see also Elliot et al., supra note 8, at
115–16; Fry et al., supra note 70, at 2.
147
Lucy Gilson, Trust and the Development of Health Care as a Social Institution, 56
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1453, 1461 (2003).
148
Cohen & Wolfe, Commentary, supra note 9, at S94.
149
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 226.
150
Cohen & Wolfe, Commentary, supra note 9, at S94 (noting that “harm reduction
recognizes that engaging in illegal activities does not mean forfeiting claims to healthcare
or other basic protections”).
151
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 223; see also Briozzo,
Iniciativas Sanitárias, supra note 2, at 34–35.
152
HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Chile, ¶ 15,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (Mar. 30, 1999) (emphasis added); see also HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Guatemala, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/72/GTM (Aug. 27, 2001).
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when care is denied to “prisoners . . . minorities, asylum seekers and illegal
immigrants.”153 Health status is independent of legal status. The latter cannot be a reason to neglect the former.
A case from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, De La Cruz
Florez v. Peru, affirms this principle.154 The case concerned the criminal
prosecution of a physician for provision of health care to suspected terrorists.155 In his separate opinion, Judge Sergio Garcı́a Ramı́rez, President
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, reasoned that the prosecution
violated “the right to life and health of the individual, both directly and by
intimidation or restrictions imposed on those who, due to their profession,
are regularly obliged to intervene in the protection of those rights.”156 Reflecting the principle of non-discrimination, the state cannot “criminally penalize . . . a doctor who provides care designed to protect the health and life
of other individuals, notwithstanding their characteristics, activities and beliefs, and the origin of their injuries or illnesses.”157 Health has its “own
meaning, totally independent of the political, religious or philosophical ideas
of the doctor and his patient.”158 The value-neutrality of a health discourse
is explicitly used in support of the humanistic principle.
A state cannot, Judge Ramı́rez reasoned, require physicians to deny
health care in service of a state objective.159 It is a basic contravention of
human rights to use individuals and their health as instruments of state policy.160 The European Court of Human Rights applied this principle in
Odièvre v. France, a case concerned with unsafe reproductive health practices.161 The European Court upheld an adoption law protecting the privacy
of the birth mother even against disclosure requests by her child.162 The law
was considered necessary to prevent health-related harm, namely that without privacy protection, women may forgo medical care and engage in clandestine unsafe births.163 The right to life was thus interpreted to protect
against denial of care for “medically irrelevant” reasons.164 Health care is
153

CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 34.
De La Cruz Florez v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 115 (Nov. 18, 2004).
155
Id. ¶ 3.
156
Id. ¶ 7 (Ramirez, J.).
157
Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
158
See Id. ¶ 7.
159
Id. ¶ 7–8; see also Odièvre v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51, 92 (2003) (Greve,
J., concurring) (“[T]he medical profession is called upon to heal, to alleviate suffering
and to comfort the medically distressed. It is not a means to be used to ensure compliance with conditions that sound counselling is unable to bring about.”).
160
Freedman, supra note 79, at 5 (defining human rights as encompassing “a right
not to have one’s reproductive and sexual capacity used as an instrument to serve the
interests of other individuals, collectivities or states”). The reasoning in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991), is objectionable under international human rights law on this basis.
161
Odièvre, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51.
162
Id. at 78–83.
163
Id. at 79–80.
164
Id. at 92 (Greve, J., concurring).
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“itself a human right not to be revoked by society to achieve some unrelated
other social goal.”165
Regardless of whether the objectives underlying criminal abortion laws
are legitimate, depriving women of health information is an inhumane means
to achieve them. Whatever objectives underlie prohibitionist laws, the state
cannot require the sacrifice of health or life to achieve them. Such a requirement is cruel, inhuman, and degrading—freedom from which is expressly
protected as a human right in international law.166 In the communication,
K.L. v. Peru, the Human Rights Committee determined that state denial of
lawful reproductive health services (specifically, a therapeutic abortion) violated this right.167 This determination offers support for harm reduction insofar as the violation turns on denial of access to health services that causes
immediate or foreseeable suffering.168
B. Treatment Within Health Settings
The humanistic principle of harm reduction applies not only to the entitlement to information, but also to the manner in which it is provided: how
individuals are treated within the health setting. In international human
rights law, health services are required to be “acceptable.” Acceptable services are respectful, ensure free and informed decision-making, guarantee
confidentiality, and are informed by the needs and perspectives of the
individual.169
Mistreatment in public health care facilities of women who terminate
their pregnancies is widespread.170 These women tend to be of lower socioeconomic status,171 thereby exacerbating power inequalities between provider and patient. They “may be left to receive care after other patients have
been seen, they may be victims of psychological aggression, or may be punished by being forced to undergo curettage without anesthesia.”172 The Uruguay Model literature acknowledges the status quo: “many health providers
seem to believe that they have the right to accuse, judge and condemn wo-

165

Id.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, supra note 20; see also
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, supra
note 20; European Convention art. 7, supra note 20.
167
HRC, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4 of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human
Rights Comm., ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (Nov. 22, 2005).
168
Id.
169
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 12(b); CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 22.
170
See, e.g., Cynthia Steele & Susana Chiarotti, With Everything Exposed: Cruelty in
Post-Abortion Care in Rosario, Argentina, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 39, 42–44
(2004).
171
See id. at 40–42; Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction, supra note 2, at 222.
172
Faúndes et al., supra note 2, at 166.
166
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men” who are seeking abortion-related care.173 Mistreatment is a barrier to
care, deterring women from seeking care, and is a wrong in itself.174
The value-neutrality of harm reduction breaks the rationale for mistreatment. Physicians divorce themselves from the normative implications of a
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. The moral or legal status of
her action is no longer reason to degrade, humiliate, or otherwise mistreat
her. In the Uruguay Model, women are treated not as criminals deserving of
punishment, but as patients entitled and, more importantly, encouraged to
seek safer-use information.175
Privacy protection is one means by which this is accomplished. The
Uruguay Model literature emphasizes that a trust relationship is essential to
overcoming the deterrent effects of secrecy and fear related to clandestine
abortion.176 “Women are often deterred from seeking health care when they
know that governmental officers, including police officers, could gain access
to their health care information.”177 The pre-consultation is designed to create a friendly environment in which patients are assured they will not be
reported to authorities, while confidentiality is the main condition of postconsultation.178 Respect for privacy is a strongly protected human right in
the medical context, imposing duties of confidentiality on state providers
and institutions.179 Confidentiality in women’s health is especially emphasized. Interpretation of the right to non-discrimination in health care acknowledges that “lack of respect for the confidentiality of patients . . . may
deter women from seeking advice and treatment and thereby adversely affect
their health and well-being.”180 Specific attention is drawn to the deterrent
173

Id.
See Cohen et al., supra note 36, at 87:
[Women] mentioned some physicians’ poor treatment of women. One woman
from an urban region said that her experience of physicians was that they ‘insult,
assault, offend, lecture and scold people.’ She said that physicians must treat women with dignity and respect if they are to be effective channels for misoprostol
information.
175
See Gerry V. Stimson, Harm Reduction in Action: Putting Theory into Practice, 9
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 401, 402 (1998) (“Harm reduction has been typified by innovative
methods for ‘contacting’ populations.”). The Uruguay Model is coupled with a community engagement strategy involving non-governmental organizations and local community groups, which inform women about the initiative and their right to access pre- and
post-abortion care. Addressing the Needs of Women in Uruguay: A Harm-Reduction
Strategy for Pregnancy Termination, IPAS, http://www.ipas.org/Topics/ma/Addressing_
the_needs_of_women_in_Uruguay.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
176
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitárias, supra note 2, at 28.
177
COOK, DICKENS & FATHALLA, supra note 75, at 177.
178
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction, supra note 2, at 223; Faúndes et al., supra note 2, at
165.
179
See, e.g., Z. v. Finland, App. No. 9/1996/627/811, 25 Eur. H. R. Rep. 371 (1997)
(finding a violation of the right to privacy contained in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms where the Helsinki
Court of Appeals disclosed the applicant’s identity and HIV-positive status in its published opinion).
180
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 12(d).
174
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effect of disclosure in the abortion context.181 Legal requirements that health
providers denounce women are interpreted as violations of the right to be
free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.182
A trust relationship, however, extends beyond privacy protection. Women report that they value consultation with a physician not only for “the
technical aspects of misprostol use . . . [but] the importance of being taken
care of, feeling cared for . . . .”183 Regardless of the impact of the Uruguay
Model on public health outcomes, the literature reports: “[w]hat is perfectly
clear . . . is that women . . . felt better cared for and safer, after participating
in the program.”184 Their inclusion in the “health system generates feelings
of calmness and safety . . . .”185 These are the individual advantages of
medicalization. A woman may value access to information through physician consultation not only pragmatically, a means to protect against risk and
harm, but as a legitimating encounter, a break from the marginality she may
otherwise experience. Deriving from the authority and social standing of the
health professional, a positive physician-patient experience may comfort, if
not restore worth to the patient as a member of the community whose health
and life matter. “[D]octor-patient interactions can, even in situations of
power inequality, function as micro-sites of healing, as relations that are
significant in restoring integrity, as providing liberating growth from abusive, repressive, or limiting constraints—in short, can function as relationships that empower the patient.”186
Harm reduction—especially information-based intervention—seeks to
empower the individual, respected as an active rather than passive entity,
capable of making free and informed decisions. The relationship between
information and decision-making is similarly emphasized in the human right
to health.187 Individuals “have the right to be fully informed, by properly
trained personnel, of their options . . . including likely benefits and potential
adverse effects of proposed procedures and available alternatives.”188 The
phrase “available alternatives” is not limited to services within the formal
health system.
The relationship between information and decision-making anchors the
Uruguay Model: providing women with information “guarantees that they
will be in a better position to take [sic] the best decisions [about their preg-

181

Id.
HRC General Comment No. 28, supra note 96, ¶ 20.
183
Cohen et al., supra note 36, at 87; Lafaurie et al., supra note 27, at 81
(“[W]omen had not received the counselling and support, both emotional and clinical,
that we found here [with clinical supervision].”).
184
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 226.
185
Id. at 223.
186
Morgan, supra note 65, at 92.
187
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 37.
188
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 20.
182
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nancy], according to their own situations, environment and values.”189 The
woman is the primary decision-maker. Her needs are not subordinated to the
interests of another, provider or state.190 She is entrusted to make decisions
about her reproductive health and to take action to protect against the risks
and harms of unsafe abortion. She is entitled to access safer-use information
without providing the physician any objectively valid reason for her decision. Her free and informed decision is reason enough. The role of the
physician is facilitative: to help her, not judge her.191 The Uruguay Model is
thus characterized as a move away from traditional paternalism toward
empowerment.192
C. Participation and Empowerment
It cannot be ignored, however, that the Uruguay Model remains a health
professional initiative. Sexual and reproductive rights are “approached from
the perspective of bioethics, professional commitment and scientific evidence.”193 The model is described as a means to “empower health professionals to actively defend their patients’ rights and act as agents of social and
legal change by giving them a public voice in the debate over unsafe abortion.”194 These are the often-criticized consequences or the disadvantage of
medicalization: domination if not monopolization of a social problem by
professionalized medical experts.195
The strongest critique is medicalization as a form of social control,
whereby surveillance and discipline are transferred from state to health authorities.196 Social control can be repressive and constitutive.197 The latter is
189
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 223 (emphasis added);
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 79 (“The harm reduction approach enables clients to access
the information they need to make educated decisions and adequately care for their own
health.”).
190
See Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 223 (discussing the
“before” visit of the Uruguay Model during which pregnant women are given advice
about their options and “[t]here is no pressure to adopt any of the alternatives, which are
presented as neutrally as possible.”).
191
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 22; Briozzo et al., Risk
Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 223; Carino et al., supra note 2, at 81.
192
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 24; Carino et al., supra note
2, at 78.
193
Briozzo & Faúndes, supra note 2, at 294.
194
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 79.
195
Conrad, supra note 61, at 223–24. For a critique of the medicalization of harm
reduction interventions specifically, see Roe, supra note 16, at 244–45.
196
Conrad, supra note 61, at 215–18; see generally Levy, supra note 65 (discussing
the consequences of medicalization in the area of women’s reproductive health); Irving K.
Zola, Medicine as an Institution of Social Control, 20 SOC. REV. 487 (1972) (analyzing
the consequences of medicalization). For a critique of harm reduction as extending the
mechanisms of social control and medical dominance, see Miller, supra note 80.
197
The concept of constitutive social control is developed in Michel Foucault’s writing on governmentality. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); Michel Foucault, Governmentality,
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most dangerous to individual freedom because it can be camouflaged as benevolent if not empowering. Precisely because of the strong trust relationship created, and the view of physicians as either benevolent holders of
expert information or liberators from marginality and restorers of integrity,
physician-patient interactions can function as powerful sites of social
control.198
Consider, for example, that counseling is a model of abortion regulation
adopted to protect not women’s rights but prenatal life, an underlying objective of most prohibitionist regimes.199 Counseling anchors the legislative
abortion framework in Germany and many other countries.200 In the German
model, counseling may include information on abortion, but its goal is to
strengthen a woman’s responsibility to continue the pregnancy and through
support to enable her to do so. Counseling is preferred over criminal sanction because it is regarded as more effective in inducing women to decide
against abortion. Women are integrated into the normative order by reminding them of and persuading them to act on their responsibilities within
it. Women must reflect on their behavior against these standards. The counseling model is thus described as “soft surveillance”—a means of social
control by constitution of the discourse, notions of what is permissible and
impermissible, and the exercise of evaluation and judgment.201
Physician-patient consultation in the Uruguay Model can be understood
as a form of social control in similar terms. The information provided to
women is not restricted to safer abortion methods. The woman is also informed of the Penal Code and whether she is lawfully entitled to an abortion
under its provisions.202 Women are informed that the health team is there to
help them, but only within the law.203 By placement of women in one of two
groups—those entitled to an abortion within the health system and those
who must resort to clandestine measures—the physician acts as a gatekeeper
and agent of the state, policing the boundaries of the law and communicating
state-sanctioned norms and values. This classification also delineates cate-

in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87 (Gordon Burchell, Colin
Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991).
198
Conrad, supra note 61, at 216; Morgan, supra note 65, at 91–92.
199
See generally Sjef Gevers, Abortion Legislation and the Future of the “Counseling Model,” 13 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 27 (2006) (exploring the counseling model of abortion
legislation; that is, the so-called “conflict (or emergency) oriented discourse model”).
200
The German “counseling model” [Beratungslösung] and its objectives are described in Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28,
1993, 88 BVerfGE 203, 1993. For a description of the counseling model in Hungary, see
Alkotmánybı́r óság (AB) [Constitutional Court], Decision of Nov. 18, 1998, 1998/105
MK.
201
Nanette Funk, Abortion Counselling and the 1995 German Abortion Law, 12
CONN. J. INT’L L. 33, 62–63 (1997). Harm reduction generally has been criticized for its
failure to engage dominant discursive practices. Miller, supra note 80, at 168.
202
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 222–23.
203
Id.
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gories of identity and can be constituting of the individual.204 By virtue of
her consultation with the physician, the woman knows her action is unlawful
and that she is by definition in breach of the normative order. The legal
environment, in other words, interferes with the capacity to create a truly
nonjudgmental encounter. The interaction reflects, constitutes, and reconstitutes the normative order, literally recreating itself over and over with each
encounter reinforcing it.205
Non-directive options counseling can serve the same social control
function as in the counseling models of prohibitionist regimes.206 The purpose of counseling is to facilitate rather than influence decision-making, and
yet it is widely reported that most women have reached a firm decision on
whether to continue or terminate pregnancy before seeking health services.207
Further exploration of the patient’s decision-making, even if non-directive, is
generally unnecessary and often unwanted—suggesting it serves interests
other than those of the woman.208
These aspects of social control in the Uruguay Model and other physician-based safer-use models are most evident when set against an alternative. It is not an imagined alternative but a parallel harm reduction initiative:
the Safe Abortion Hotline. This initiative was developed by a Dutch nonprofit organization, Women on Waves (“WOW”).209 Founded in 1999 by a
physician-activist, WOW is dedicated to providing women living in restric204
Miller, supra note 80, at 174–75 (“Whilst the rhetoric of harm minimization states
that it holds ‘a value-neutral view of users’, it fails to consider the fact that through the
classification of individuals according to group characteristics, harm minimization adds
to the discourses that create an oppositional mindset and perpetuates marginalization.”).
A critique of the physician-patient interaction as a site of social control should not neglect
the capacity for agency and acts of resistance. Women may actively co-construct the
meaning of their actions and their identity within and against the normative order.
205
Susan A. Speer & Ceri Parsons, Gatekeeping Gender: Some Features of the Use
of Hypothetical Questions in the Psychiatric Assessment of Transsexual Patients, 17 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 785, 806 (2006).
206
There is an important difference between options counseling and abortion counseling. Options counseling refers to counseling on the decision to continue or terminate a
pregnancy. Abortion counseling refers to counseling once a woman has decided to terminate the pregnancy, and generally pertains to different methods of abortion; that is, the
experience, efficacy and safety, symptoms, and side effects.
207
See, e.g., Usha Kumar, Paula Baraitser, Sheila Morton & Helen Massil, Decision
Making and Referral Prior to Abortion: A Qualitative Study of Women’s Experiences, 30
J. FAM. PLAN. & REPROD. HEALTH CARE 51, 52–53; Philippa Matthews & Sarah Ball,
Letter, Counselling, Psychological Morbidity and Termination of Pregnancy, 29 J. FAM.
PLAN. & REPROD. HEALTH 39, 39 (2003).
208
The 2011 draft clinical guideline of the U.K. Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists on pre-abortion management recommends that “[w]omen who are certain of their decision to have an abortion should not be subjected to compulsory counselling.” Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, The Care of Women
Requesting Induced Abortion: Evidence-Based Clinical Guideline Number 7, at 16 (Jan.
2011) (draft for peer review), available at http://www.ossyr.org.ar/pdf/TheCareOfWomen
RequestingInducedAbortion_PeerReviewDraft_Jan2011.pdf. The recommendation is supported by evidence that the vast majority of women requesting an abortion define their
pregnancy as unwanted. Id. at 51.
209
WOMEN ON WAVES, http://www.womenonwaves.org (last updated Jan. 16, 2011).
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tive legal environments with access to safe, non-surgical abortion. WOW is
perhaps best known for its “Abortion Ship”—the provision of medication
abortion in a mobile clinic aboard a commissioned ship in international
waters.210
The following description of the objectives and design of the Safe
Abortion Hotline is based on the WOW website.211 Rather than as harm reduction, access to safer-use information is envisioned as a means to allow
women to take their lives into their own hands irrespective of the law and
without supervision of health professionals. WOW seeks to empower women to self-administer misoprostol for pregnancy termination by distributing
information through the internet and by supporting safe abortion telephone
hotlines run by women’s organizations. Hotline numbers are posted in public spaces (bathrooms, restaurants, and trains), advertising “free information
services for women with unwanted pregnancies.” The launch of the hotlines
is often accompanied by public campaigns and marches. When women call
the hotline, they are informed about misoprostol, including the brand names
under which it is available, where they can obtain it, instructions for safe and
effective use, and descriptions of the process. Women are informed about
the lawfulness of follow-up treatment for miscarriage and post-abortion care.
Safe Abortion hotlines have been launched in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador,
Pakistan, and Peru.212 The trained hotline operators are members of local
women’s organizations, and the information they provide is based on research conducted or published by the World Health Organization and the
Latin American Federation of Obstetric and Gynecological Societies.213
The Safe Abortion Hotline raises the question: Why must access to
safer-use abortion information be mediated through health professionals
within a clinical setting? This question applies beyond criminally restrictive
210
See Affaire Women on Waves et autres c. Portgual [Women on Waves and others
v. Portugal], App. No. 31276/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc/
(follow “HUDOC database” hyperlink; type case name into “title” field; then follow
“search” hyperlink) (holding that the government of Portugal was in violation of the right
to freedom of expression for banning and physically blocking a decriminalization campaign by WOW).
211
Safe Abortion Hotline Peru, May 2010, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://www.womenon
waves.org/set-2212-en.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
212
The hotline in Argentina was launched in 2009. The hotlines in Chile and Ecuador, both launched in 2009, are supported by the Coordinadora Juvenil por la Equidad de
Género and Women on Waves. The hotline in Peru, launched in 2010, is supported by
the Collective for Free Information for Women. Launched in 2010, the hotline in Pakistan is supported by Asia Safe Abortion Partnership, Women on Waves, and Women on
Web. Further information on these hotlines is available through the following blogs:
http://www.informacionaborto.blogspot.com, http://www.abortoinformacionsegura.blog
spot.com, http://www.lineabortoinfosegura.blogspot.com.
213
The WOW website provides links to relevant research on safe misoprostol-use
published in leading medical journals such as the LANCET, and to an independent website with an extensive bibliography of medical literature on misoprostol use in obstetrics
and gynecology (http://www.misoprostol.org/). How can I do an abortion with pills?,
WOMEN ON WAVES, http://www.womenonwaves.org/set-274-en.html (last visited Apr.
16, 2011).
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environments to medication abortion generally as a woman-centered
method.214 Asked differently: Why are medical professionals privileged as
the source of information?
Physician-consultation is valued for pragmatic reasons of safety and
accurate information. Professional training, for example, is claimed to
ensure clear or correct instruction.215 Reports suggest that women also
regard medical professionals as the only trustworthy source of healthrelated information.216 As described, the expertise of physicians combined
with their benevolent social role contributes to the legitimating if not empowering experience of the medical encounter: restoring integrity and worth
to the woman by accepting her into the health system.217 The trustworthiness
of physicians extends into the policy realm. “[O]rganisational backing
from respected institutions, such as medical schools, professional medical
societies, and ministries of health adds legitimacy to the [Uruguay] initiative . . . .”218
The privileged status of physicians—their expertise and control—is
challenged in harm reduction initiatives such as the Safe Abortion Hotline.
Effective communication on the safer use of misoprostol outside the medical
context undermines the claim to expertise, namely that physicians are
uniquely qualified to provide information and ensure safer-use. Women’s
health movements have long sought to demystify medical expertise in reproductive health, to “challeng[e] the ‘credentialed expert’ monopoly” over
health, and to translate it in empowering ways to large communities of women, to democratize it.219 Women’s preference for physician-controlled information, the comfort they derive from the experience, may itself be
214
See generally Wendy Simonds, Charlotte Ellertson, Beverly Winikoff & Kimberly
Springer, Providers, Pills, and Power: The US Mifepristone Abortion Trials and
Caregivers’ Interpretations of Clinical Power Dynamics, 5 HEALTH 207 (2001) (describing the power dynamic between physician and patient with introduction of medicated
abortion). Home-use of medication abortion under permissive legal frameworks is also a
subject of increasing attention. See generally Christian Fiala, Beverly Winikoff, Lotti
Helström, Margareta Hellborg & Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson, Acceptability of HomeUse of Misoprostol in Medical Abortion, 70 CONTRACEPTION 387 (2004) (describing research on the acceptance of home-use abortion); see also British Pregnancy Advisory
Serv. v. Sec’y of State for Health, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 235 (Eng.) (holding that responsibility for determining the appropriate place of treatment resided with the British
Secretary of State).
215
See Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/
88 & 14235/88, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244, 267 (1992) (emphasizing the positive health
effects of access to information through “qualified personnel” rather than public avenues
such as magazines or phone directories); see also Sherris et al., supra note 27, at 79 (“All
providers expressed concern about self-use and cited specific safety issues . . . . [and]
most remained concerned about its use without medical supervision.”).
216
Cohen et al., supra note 36, at 89.
217
See supra text accompanying notes 183–86.
218
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 82.
219
Morgan, supra note 65, at 113; see also C.E. Joffe, T.A. Weitz & C.L. Stacey,
Uneasy Alliances: Pro-Choice Physicians, Feminist Health Activists and the Struggle for
Abortion Rights, 26 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 775, 785–76 (2004).
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challenged as over-informed by this mystification. Recall that the physicianconsultation can function as a powerful site of social control precisely because it is experienced as legitimating if not empowering. The claim of social control is not unmerited. Physician-controlled information is sometimes
expressly justified as necessary to ensure that abortion is not made too easy,
that women cannot use the method “too frequently” or “irresponsibly.”220
The objective of the Safe Abortion Hotline, in contrast, is to “empower women as knowledgeable health care subjects . . . capable of bypassing medical
control.”221 The model operates on the assumption that “whoever controls
access to contraception and abortion effectively owns the tools to control
women’s reproduction. And one key to controlling access . . . is to control
information about them and their uses.”222
The Safe Abortion Hotline as a harm reduction strategy is qualitatively
different from patient-physician consultation. It is most appropriately and
historically characterized as one of many safe abortion initiatives marked by
a feminist ideology of “self-help” and lay provision of services.223 Among
the most renowned is the Abortion Counseling Service of the Chicago Women’s Liberation Union, or “Jane,” an underground collective in the United
States that operated from 1969 to 1973 before the legal reform that accompanied Roe v. Wade.224 Feminist activists with no formal medical training
provided abortion counseling and referrals, but later performed abortions
themselves with a safety record better than or comparable to that of licensed
facilities.225 Jane remains celebrated as a feminist model of care, for “its
demonstration that abortions could be done by women for women—in short,
abortion could be demedicalized.”226
The Safe Abortion Hotline seeks not simply to provide access to information, but to empower women collectively to appropriate and share information on safer abortion, to “seize the means of reproduction.”227
Demystification and democratization are not value-neutral but normative
acts. The Declaration on Public Information for Safer Abortion that accompanied the launch of the Argentina hotline speaks to its political dimen220

Espinoza et al., supra note 30, at 132.
Morgan, supra note 65, at 113.
222
Freedman, supra note 79, at 31.
223
See generally Denise A. Copelton, Menstrual Extraction, Abortion, and the Political Context of Feminist Self-Help, 8 GENDER PERSP. ON REPROD. & SEXUALITY: ADVANCES IN GENDER RES. 129 (2004) (examining woman-centered approaches to abortion
and reproductive health more generally).
224
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a detailed description of Jane, see LAURA
KAPLAN, THE STORY OF JANE: THE LEGENDARY UNDERGROUND FEMINIST ABORTION SERVICE (1995); Katherine Pyne Addelson, Moral Revolution, 22 RADICAL AM. 36 (1988);
Pauline B. Bart, Seizing the Means of Reproduction: An Illegal Feminist Abortion Collective—How and Why it Worked, 10 QUALITATIVE SOC. 339 (1987).
225
Mary Kay Blakely, Remembering Jane, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 23, 1990,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/magazine/hers-remembering-jane.html.
226
Joffe, Weitz & Stacey, supra note 219, at 787.
227
See Bart, supra note 224.
221

R
R
R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\34-2\HLG202.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 37

Access to Information on Safe Abortion

13-JUN-11

8:03

449

sion.228 The Declaration expressly defines knowledge (information) as an
instrument of domination and control, and laments that its diffusion and utilization remains in the hands of a few, subject to their interests rather than the
real needs and legitimate desires of women.229 “We consider scientific and
technological knowledge to be the common property of all humanity, and it
should be accessible to everyone, in free circulation . . . . Every obstacle
impeding its availability should be removed.”230
The Declaration is drafted in the first person, eliding distinction between provider and recipient of information.231 They only share the common
identity of being women.232 Provider and recipient are leveled moreover by
the common ‘legal ambiguity’ of their actions: there is no obsessive distinguishing between information and promotion, no concern to avoid running
afoul of the law.233 The objective is to provide information truly irrespective
of legality. This is further demonstrated in the refusal to separate women
who call the hotline by the legal status of their abortion.234 Women are again
228
Declaration—Abortion: More Information, Less Risks (Declaración: Aborto:
Más Información, Menos Riesgos), WOMEN ON WAVES, http://www.womenonwaves.org/
article-2092-en.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Abortion Declaration].
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
See Bart, supra note 224, at 351–52 (noting that members of Jane did not use the
term “patient” because it implied a subject-object relation).
233
Bart identifies “illegality” in the tradition of civil disobedience as the crux of
Jane. “No time was spent in what they termed hassling with the licensing agencies or
maintaining bureaucratic forms. . . . [W]e were all partners in the crime of demanding
the freedom to control our own bodies and our own childbearing.” Id. at 346, 352. See
also Carole Joffe, What Abortion Counselors Want From Their Clients, 26 SOC. PROBS.
112, 113 (1978) (describing the feminist ideological underpinnings of abortion counseling); Barbara Katz Rothman & Melinda Detlefs, Women Talking to Women: Abortion
Counselors and Genetic Counselors, in THE WORTH OF WOMEN’S WORK: A QUALITATIVE
SYNTHESIS 151, 152 (Anne Statham, Eleanor M. Miller & Hans O. Mauksch eds., 1988)
(characterizing abortion counseling as an activist illegal activity highly valued in a political counterculture).
234
The press release that accompanied the launch of the Safe Abortion Hotline in
Peru, for example, identified information-provision as a means by which women can
prevent unsafe abortion, “irrespective of the availability or willingness of doctors or the
legality of abortion in their country.” Press Release: Abortion Hotline Launched in
Lima, Peru, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://www.womenonwaves.org/article-2233-en.html
(last visited Apr. 16, 2011). All women at risk of unsafe abortion, in other words,
whether because of denied access or unavailability of lawful services or because of legal
restrictions, are the intended beneficiaries of the service. The only distinction drawn
between women is socio-economic: “[W]omen who are wealthy and/or very computer
literate can either pay large amounts of money to get a safe abortion in a well-run clandestine clinic, or travel abroad, or at least access the reliable information on a number of
websites . . . . However, most women are not able to pay for the Internet and/or do not
know where to look for this information.” Peru Hotline, Day 1, WOMEN ON WAVES,
http://www.womenonwaves.org/article-2213-en.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011). The
Safe Abortion Hotline is intended to provide the latter group of women, that is most
women, with access to safer-use information. The implementation of the Uruguay Model
in public health facilities similarly seeks to ensure that all women regardless of social or
economic status can access safer-use information. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
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defined by a common status, that of having an unwanted pregnancy. The
only standards that matter are the individual woman’s beliefs, values, and
personal ideals. These are not set against a state-sanctioned norm.
The Declaration is most striking in the primary grounding of its political claims in international human rights law.235 Women are declared to have
not only the capacity but also the right to use complete and current information in their decision-making.236 The Declaration demands that the state respect women’s autonomy and dignity and recognize their right to
information on safer abortion.237
This political dimension of the Safe Abortion Hotline reveals its fundamental difference from the Uruguay Model. The danger of empowering
health professionals as agents of change—as envisaged in the Uruguay
Model—is that the right to access safer-use abortion information will come
to be defined exclusively in the medicalized terms of the initiative: as the
medical management of a health problem.238 The right to access information
means something very different to the women at the Safe Abortion Hotline.
Information is instrumental to women’s self-determination. “Reproductive
information is a political resource . . . [that] enables women to take control
of their lives and to join in transforming social institutions.”239 The Declaration reflects both dimensions of self-determination: women’s autonomy to
make decisions about their bodies according to their own beliefs, values, and
ideals, and women’s claims for decriminalization of abortion, the transformation of law as a social institution.240 A feminist ideology underlies WOW
and its movement for safer abortion.241
Harm reduction acknowledges the importance of participation within
the health intervention. In the Uruguay Model, however, it is a depoliticized form: the right to free and informed decision-making within a
health setting. A human rights approach requires more.242 It requires participation as empowerment within a political space.243 The right to health is
interpreted to require “improvement and furtherance of participation of the
235
The Declaration cites to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights,
and to related jurisprudence under these treaties. Abortion Declaration, supra note 228.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
See, e.g., Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 222 (“[Unsafe
abortion is] a cause of maternal death that can be relatively easily reduced with the right
interventions.”).
239
Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 587, 646 (1993).
240
See Abortion Declaration, supra note 228.
241
See Friedman et al., supra note 15, at 9 (describing harm reduction initiatives as
movements rather than service agencies).
242
See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 13, at 231–32 (distinguishing between weak and strong
human rights in harm reduction).
243
See generally Pol De Vos, Wim de Caukelaire, Geraldine Malaise, Dennis Pérez,
Pierre Lefèvre & Patrick Van der Stuyft, Health Through People’s Empowerment: A
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population in the provision of . . . health services . . . and, in particular,
participation in political decisions relating to the right to health . . . .”244 The
latter part of the statement suggests the right to participation concerns how
the boundaries are set in the first instance: why limit access to safer-use
information on abortion to the patient-physician encounter? This preference
comes from somewhere and that somewhere is a political space.245 Empowerment in a human rights approach is defined precisely by the capacity of
individuals and communities to participate “as ‘makers and shapers’ rather
than as ‘users and choosers’ of . . . interventions.”246 Participation in governance reflects the use of information as a political resource for action, a
means by which women can gain control over their health and lives by transforming social institutions, including the health care system and the law on
abortion. Engagement with the right to access information on safer abortion
as an issue of women’s self-determination is exemplary of participation as
empowerment. This political dimension of harm reduction is essential to
ensure that an empowerment strategy does not thereby discharge the state of
its responsibility to address unsafe abortion and the continuing needs of women within the formal health system.247 The growth of civil society should
neither require nor allow for the contraction of the state, and its human rights
obligations to protect life and health.
V. THE PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLE
Harm reduction is largely adopted in criminal legal frameworks, but
rather than engage with abstract policy goals of prohibition or legalization, it
is pragmatic. One aspect of this pragmatic orientation is the acceptance that
individuals will engage in the activity regardless of legal prohibition, that
Rights-Based Approach to Participation, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 23 (2009) (analyzing
the core aspects of participation and empowerment from a human rights perspective).
244
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 17; see also Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone
to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health,
Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 39–43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/11 (Jan. 31, 2008) (by Paul Hunt);
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and
Mental Health, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49 (Feb. 16,
2004) (by Paul Hunt).
245
See HELEN POTTS, HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF ESSEX, PARTICIPATION AND THE
RIGHT TO THE HIGHEST ATTAINABLE STANDARD OF HEALTH 25 (2008), available at http:/
/www.essex.ac.uk/human_rights_centre/research/rth/docs/Participation.pdf.
246
Alicia Ely Yamin, Suffering and Powerlessness: The Significance of Promoting
Participation in Rights-Based Approaches to Health, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 5, 15
(2009) (citing John Gaventa, Towards Participatory Governance: Assessing the Transformative Possibilities, in PARTICIPATION—FROM TYRANNY TO TRANSFORMATION? EXPLORING NEW APPROACHES TO PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT 25, 29 (Samuel Hickey
& Giles Mohan eds., 2004)).
247
See generally Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment,
20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139 (2010) (critiquing empowerment models as a means
to address the problem of domestic violence).
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eradication of the activity is unrealistic if not impossible. The objective is
thus to reduce the harm associated with the activity. The Uruguay Model is
designed to reduce the health-related harms of unsafe abortion within the
existing legal framework. Unsafe abortion is treated as an enduring but
nonetheless contingent feature of women’s lives.
A. Harm, Risk and Vulnerability Reduction
The Uruguay Model literature describes harm reduction as an effort “to
minimize the negative effect of certain social behaviors that are known to be
dangerous, but are practiced by a group of people that are particularly vulnerable to engaging in such practices.”248 The terms ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’
refer to distinct concepts and carry unique meaning in harm reduction discourse.249 Risk is defined as the likelihood of the harmful consequences or
negative effects resulting from behaviors known to be dangerous, or risk
behaviors.250 Much of harm reduction is risk reduction insofar as it seeks to
minimize the risk or likelihood of harm.251 More specifically, harm reduction tends to focus on individual-level risk factors—that is, on persons who
are particularly vulnerable—and to function through individual behavior
modification or the altering of risk behavior.252 The Uruguay Model, for
example, seeks to minimize the harms of unsafe abortion through behavior
modification, namely the safer use of medicines to terminate pregnancy and
to thereby reduce the likelihood of complications.
In risk reduction, the risk and harm of unsafe abortion can be conceptualized as having a simple, objective, factual existence. Neglected are the
factors that render an individual or group of individuals vulnerable to the
risk behavior or that otherwise influence decision-making to engage in the

248

Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategies, supra note 2, at 222.
See, e.g., Nadine Ezard, Commentary, Public Health, Human Rights and the
Harm Reduction Paradigm: From Risk Reduction to Vulnerability Reduction, 12 INT’L J.
DRUG POL’Y 207 (2001) (exploring the utility of expanding the harm reduction paradigm
to incorporate vulnerability reduction); Tim Rhodes, Commentary, The ‘Risk Environment’: A Framework for Understanding and Reducing Drug-Related Harm, 13 INT’L J.
DRUG POL’Y 85 (2002) (offering the concept of the ‘risk environment’ as a framework to
overcome the limits of individualism in harm reduction) [hereinafter Rhodes, Risk Environment]; Tim Rhodes, Risk Environments and Drug Harms: A Social Science for Harm
Reduction Approach, 20 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 193, 196 (2009) (considering different social science perspectives on drug-related harms as a product of the risk environments in
which individuals act) [hereinafter Rhodes, Social Science for Harm Reduction]; Tim
Rhodes, Merrill Singer, Philippe Bourgois, Samuel R. Friedman & Steffanie A.
Strathdee, The Social Structural Production of HIV Risk Among Injecting Drug Users, 61
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1026 (2005) (describing the risk environment, the interplay of social,
structural and political-economic factors, that shape HIV risk in injection drug use)
[hereinafter Rhodes et al., Social Structural Production].
250
Ezard, supra note 249, at 211.
251
Id. at 211–12.
252
Id. at 212; Rhodes, Risk Environment, supra note 249, at 86; Rhodes, Social Science for Harm Reduction, supra note 249, at 194.
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behavior.253 Vulnerability concerns “how risk and harm . . . [are] mediated
by, or a product of, determinants that extend beyond proximate individuallevel factors . . . .”254 The space in which vulnerability factors—physical,
geographic, social, economic, and political situations, processes, and structures—interact to influence risk is referred to as the risk environment.255
Vulnerability thus focuses on the context that shapes the likelihood of the
risk behavior itself. Harm reduction can be accomplished through vulnerability reduction. Interventions may reduce harm by reducing engagement in
the activity itself, the behavior known to be dangerous. A lower incidence
of unsafe abortion, for example, will reduce abortion-related mortality and
morbidity.256
Harm reduction as vulnerability reduction, however, requires that the
focus of intervention shift from the individual to their environment.257 In a
vulnerability paradigm, efforts to understand or change unsafe abortion practices are meaningless without consideration of the environments in which
women live: the situations, processes, and structures that underlie and influence their behavior.258 Unsafe abortion, in other words, cannot solely be
attributed to the characteristics or behavior of individual women. The advantage of the vulnerability paradigm is that it seeks to complicate and contextualize the causes of risk and harm: “to separate more proximal notions
or risk from more distal notions of vulnerability.”259 Shifting the causal
analysis of harm from the individual to their environment shifts the responsibility for that harm from individuals alone to the social and political-economic institutions that have a role in harm production.260 Responsibility for
the harms of unsafe abortion is redirected to those who can and do shape the
intermediate and structural factors that influence individual behavior. Attention is called to “other sorts of risk takers, namely policy makers.”261

253

Ezard, supra note 249, at 213, 214, 217.
Rhodes, Social Science for Harm Reduction, supra note 249, at 194.
255
Id. at 193; Rhodes, Risk Environment, supra note 249, at 88; Rhodes et al., Social
Structural Production, supra note 249, at 1027.
256
For a clear articulation of the distinction between risk and vulnerability reduction,
consider the relationship between family planning and safe motherhood. Family planning
can reduce total numbers of maternal deaths and improve maternal mortality. Family
planning does little, however, to reduce deaths among pregnant women; in other words,
to reduce the risks of continuing pregnancy to term. Deborah Maine, Lynn Freedman,
Farida Shaheed & Schuyler Frautschi, Risk, Reproduction, and Rights: The Uses of Reproductive Health Data, in POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT: OLD DEBATES, NEW CONCLUSIONS 203, 212 (Robert Cassen ed., 1994). The same logic applies to family planning
and safe abortion. Improved access to family planning may reduce numbers of unsafe
abortion, but it does little to make abortion safer.
257
Rhodes, Risk Environment, supra note 249, at 91.
258
Rhodes, Social Science for Harm Reduction, supra note 249, at 196.
259
Ezard, supra note 249, at 208; see also Rhodes, Social Science for Harm Reduction, supra note 249, at 198.
260
Rhodes, Social Science for Harm Reduction, supra note 249, at 194.
261
Alex Wodak, Response, All Drug Politics is Local, 17 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 83, 84
(2006).
254
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Vulnerability reduction, for this reason, is convergent with a human
rights approach.262 The unit of interest, analysis, and change is the structure
or system.263 By making visible and acting on the structural dimensions of
risk and harm, including the legal and policy environment, vulnerability reduction is a human rights approach to harm reduction.264 In unsafe abortion,
vulnerability reduction focuses on the factors that contribute to unwanted
pregnancy and the clandestine nature of abortion as the causes of unsafe
abortion. Human rights law holds the state accountable for these factors and
requires remedial action.
The Uruguay Model incorporates not only the reduction of risk and
harm, but also the reduction of vulnerability. It seeks to reduce the harm of
unsafe abortion and to reduce the numbers of unsafe abortions.265 In pursuit
of the latter objective, the model addresses underlying factors that render
women vulnerable to unsafe abortion: Why do women engage in unsafe
abortion? What factors influence a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy? Transcending simplistic accounts of individual decision-making, the
model seeks to contextualize a woman’s experience of unsafe abortion
within a risk environment.
The vulnerability approach of the Uruguay Model is reflected in its focus on the unmet needs of women who resort to clandestine abortion. These
include: access to contraception to prevent unwanted pregnancy, accurate
pregnancy diagnosis to avoid unnecessary recourse to abortion, access to
services within the formal health sector when entitled by law, and support
for women who wish to carry pregnancies to term.266 Sexual violence,
abuse, and exploitation are also recognized as vulnerability factors.267
The Uruguay Model is designed to meet these needs and to thereby
reduce women’s vulnerability to unsafe abortion. In addition to safer-use
information, the following services and information are provided: contraceptive options on request to avoid future unwanted pregnancy, medical examination to confirm pregnancy and gestational age, abortion services within the

262
See supra text accompanying notes 81–84. Cf. Ezard, supra note 249, at 209–10
(mapping measures to reduce harm, the risk of harm, and underlying vulnerabilities
against human rights in which such measures can be grounded); Jürgens et al., supra note
9, at 482 (arguing that an understanding of harm reduction must include reduction of
vulnerability); Wolfe & Cohen, Human Rights and HIV Prevention, supra note 9, at S57
(demonstrating how examining risk environments, which include factors increasing vulnerability, contextualizes intravenous drug use).
263
Rhodes et al., Social Structural Production, supra note 249, at 1036.
264
Ezard, supra note 249, at 215, 217; Rhodes, Social Science for Harm Reduction,
supra note 249, at 194; Rhodes, Risk Environment, supra note 249, at 92.
265
The Uruguay Model objectives are to protect the health of women, reduce the
risks and harm associated with unsafe abortion, reduce the numbers of unsafe abortions,
and lower the number of maternal deaths associated with this practice. See Briozzo et al.,
Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 21.
266
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 225.
267
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 30.
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health facility when entitled by law, and information about available support
and adoption alternatives should a woman wish to continue her pregnancy.268
The Uruguay Model literature expressly identifies the history of state
failure to protect women’s sexual and reproductive rights as the cause of
unwanted pregnancy leading to unsafe abortion: the failure to provide access
to sexual health information and education, contraceptives, and other sexual
health services.269 The linking of women’s vulnerability to state inaction reflects a human rights approach.
International human rights law recognizes state obligations to address
vulnerability factors related to unsafe abortion. Unequal gender relations—
which limit the capacity of women and adolescent girls to refuse sex or
engage in contraceptive practices—are expressly named as social structural
causes of unwanted pregnancy.270 The conception of unsafe abortion as a
form of violence against women, and a human rights violation on this basis,
relies on a vulnerability approach. Reproductive health policies are identified as contributing to or causing unsafe abortion.271 Women should not be
forced to seek unsafe abortion, for example, because of unmet needs, such as
lack of appropriate fertility control services.272
Prevention of unwanted pregnancy has received much attention in international human rights law. “[T]he large numbers of couples who would
like to limit their family size but lack access to or do not use any form of
contraception provide an important indication for States parties of possible
breaches of their duties to ensure women’s access to health care.”273 Racial
and other social disparities in unwanted pregnancy and abortion rates are
also interpreted as violations of the right to non-discrimination in health.274
States are thus called upon to “[p]rioritize the prevention of unwanted pregnancy through family planning and sex education and reduce maternal mortality rates through safe motherhood services and prenatal assistance.”275
These services are to be provided free of charge where necessary.276 Prenatal
268

Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 223–24.
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 30–31.
270
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 18.
271
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 89,
¶ 45.
272
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 91, ¶ 24(m).
273
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 17.
274
Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 72nd–73rd Sess.,
Feb. 18–Mar. 7, July 28–Aug. 15, 2008, ¶ 504, U.N. Doc. A/63/18; GAOR, 63rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 18 (2008). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
monitors and enforces the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. Article 5(iv) requires the state to prohibit and eliminate racial
discrimination and to guarantee the right of everyone to public health, medical care, social security, and social services without discrimination. See International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
275
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 31(c). See also id.
¶¶ 2, 17, 23, 28.
276
Id. ¶ 27.
269
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and childcare services reduce abortion-related maternal mortality by supporting women who wish to continue their pregnancies. Access to contraceptives and other reproductive health services is regarded as essential to
“prevent women from resorting to unsafe abortion.”277
International human rights law also addresses denied access to lawful
abortion as a vulnerability factor. Many women resort to unsafe abortion
because they cannot access services to which they are lawfully entitled.278
Human rights have thus been interpreted to require state regulation and procedural safeguards to ensure women are not wrongfully denied lawful services.279 In Tysiac v. Poland, the European Court of Human Rights
articulated a positive state obligation to enact a legal framework to ensure
lawful abortion services are accessible in practice.280 In Paulina del Carmen
Ramı́rez Jacinto v. Mexico, a friendly settlement before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights resulted in a Ministry of Health circular calling on state institutions to ensure access to lawful abortion.281 Consistent
with this trend, guidelines have been developed on medico-legal indications
for abortion in Uruguay to improve women’s access to lawful services.282
B. Criminal Law Reform and Harm Reduction
A vulnerability approach to unsafe abortion inevitably leads to the
criminal law. Women resort to unsafe abortion because they are not lawfully
277
CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, ¶ 309, U.N. Doc. A/59/
38 (Mar. 18, 2004).
278
Lawful services are inaccessible for a range of reasons. Primary among them is
misinformation on the legal indications for abortion. Human Rights Watch has documented information deficits and their effects on safe abortion in Argentina, Mexico, and
Peru. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECISIONS DENIED: WOMEN’S ACCESS TO
CONTRACEPTIVES AND ABORTION IN ARGENTINA (2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY
RIGHTS AND MY RIGHT TO KNOW: LACK OF ACCESS TO THERAPEUTIC ABORTION IN PERU
(2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SECOND ASSAULT: OBSTRUCTING ACCESS TO LEGAL
ABORTION AFTER RAPE IN MEXICO (2006).
279
Concerned about “the difficulties in obtaining a legal abortion . . . owing, inter
alia, to the lack of implementing regulations for the laws in force and the tendency, as a
result, for many women to seek illegal and unsafe abortions,” CEDAW urged the state to
adopt regulations implementing the law. CEDAW, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Bolivia, ¶¶ 42–43, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/4 (Apr. 8, 2008). “Concerned that, in practice, women may
not have access to legal abortion services,” CEDAW urged the state to adopt a regulatory
framework and guidelines to ensure access to legal abortions services. CEDAW, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Colombia, ¶¶ 22–23, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/COL/CO/6 (Feb. 2, 2007) [hereinafter
CEDAW Concluding Comments: Columbia].
280
Tysiac v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42, 970–74 (2007).
281
Paulina del Carmen Ramı́rez Jacinto v. Mexico, Friendly Settlement, “Friendly
Settlement Agreement,” ¶ 16 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://www.
cidh.org/annualrep/2007eng/Mexico161.02eng.htm; Oficio-Circular No. 2192 [Official
Circular No. 2192], Centro Nacional de Equidad de Genero Y Salud Reproductivia [National Center of Gender Equity and Reproductive Health], 4 de Abril de 2006 (Mex.).
282
Round Up: Law and Policy, supra note 43, at 211.
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entitled to access safe services. Prohibition is a cause of unsafe abortion.
On another interpretation, of course, prohibition may itself be claimed a
harm reduction strategy: it too seeks to prohibit engagement in and thus
vulnerability to unsafe abortion.283 If clandestine abortion can be effectively
prohibited, its health-related harms will be correspondingly reduced if not
eliminated.
Harm reduction, however, does not refer to any and all interventions
intended to minimize risk. A second aspect of its pragmatic orientation is
the favoring of a consequentialist evidence-based assessment (i.e., cost-benefit efficiency or means-ends effectiveness).284 The Uruguay Model, for example, is assessed by its effectiveness in terms of behavior change (“all of
the women who returned for the ‘after visit’ and who had had an abortion
said it was carried out it [sic] with misoprostol”) and health outcomes
(“There were no maternal deaths or severe complications due to abortion
registered among the women who participated in the program . . . .”).285 A
means-ends effectiveness assessment is explicit: “It appears that our strategy
is achieving its purpose of reducing maternal complications and deaths associated with unsafe abortion, through the several mechanisms described
above.”286
Law within a harm reduction approach is assessed in similar pragmatic
terms, an intervention to change behavior and reduce harmful consequences.
A prohibitionist abortion law must thus reduce more harm than it creates. If
it does not, the law cannot be characterized as harm reduction. On the contrary, a harm reduction approach may properly require its reform.
Criminal abortion law, in other words, may be treated as a structural
vulnerability factor if on balance it contributes to rather than reduces unsafe
abortion. Evidence suggests that prohibition has not produced its purported
benefits. It has been counter-productive. The criminal law, as described in
the Uruguay Model literature, “directly contribute[s] to the circumstances
that force women . . . to resort to unsafe and clandestine abortion practices.”287 Decriminalization is thus advocated as a harm reduction intervention: “[A]bortion must be legal for the procedure to be offered under safe
conditions.”288
283
Harm reduction rhetoric to support prohibitionist law and policy is criticized in
the drug use context. Miller, supra note 80, at 169 (“The rationality . . . that ultimately
abstinence reduces harm, appears somewhat dubious and illustrates not only an ignorance
of the fundamental basis of harm minimization, but also a rhetorical and discursive strategy designed to taint the more progressive harm-reduction strategies.”).
284
See Gostin & Lazzarini, supra note 119, at 643–44 (describing consequentialist
analysis).
285
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 224.
286
Id. at 226.
287
Carino et al., supra note 2, at 77.
288
Faúndes et al., supra note 2, at 165. The terms decriminalization and legalization
are not strictly distinguished in the article given that abortion (at least during some stage
of gestation) for safety reasons must remain a medical procedure and thus subject to a
regulated system the same as all other medical procedures.
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The legal status of abortion is well-documented as a co-determinant of
the frequency and related mortality of unsafe abortion.289 Abortion rates do
not correlate to the legal status of abortion.290 First, criminalization is ineffective in achieving its stated objective: preventing abortion. The millions of
unsafe abortions performed every year in countries with restrictive criminal
abortion laws testify to this fact. These countries also predictably have high
rates of abortion-related death and disability.291 Second, liberalization of
abortion laws, including decriminalization throughout pregnancy or to a defined gestational limit, is associated with significantly decreased abortionrelated harm.292 This is because abortion rates in countries with liberal laws
are lower than in countries with restrictive laws,293 but more importantly,
because safe abortion methods, such as those recommended by the World
Health Organization, are among the safest clinical interventions with minimum morbidity and a negligible risk of death.294 Liberalization allows for
the training of practitioners, proper facilities and equipment, and greater accessibility to information and services.295 The principal effect of liberalization is thus to shift “previously clandestine, unsafe procedures to legal and
safe ones.”296
The evidence is so overwhelming that criminal laws generate more
health-related harm than they prevent, it is exceedingly difficult not to advo-

289
WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN AND HEALTH: TODAY’S EVIDENCE, TOMORROW’S
AGENDA 42–43 (2009); see generally Marge Berer, National Laws and Unsafe Abortion:
The Parameters of Change, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 1 (2004) (presenting data
indicating that, where legislation allowed abortion, there is lower incidence of unsafe
abortion and related mortality, as well as data showing that most abortions become safe
when women’s reasons for abortion and legal grounds coincide).
290
Shah & Ahman, supra note 1, at 93.
291
K. Singh & S.S. Ratnam, The Influence of Abortion Legislation on Maternal Mortality, 63 Suppl. 1 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS S123, S127–28 (1998).
292
Id. at S126, S128 (describing the decrease in maternal mortality rates attributed to
the liberalization of abortion legislation); see also Rachel Jewkes, Helen Rees, Kim Dickson, Heather Brown & Jonathan Levin, The Impact of Age on the Epidemiology of Incomplete Abortions in South Africa After Legislative Change, 112 BJOG: INT’L J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNAECOLOGY 355 (2005) (describing the positive impact of legalization on abortionrelated mortality and morbidity); Brooke R. Johnson, Mihai Horga & Peter Fajans, A
Strategic Assessment of Abortion and Contraception in Romania, 12 REPROD. HEALTH
MATTERS 184, 184 (2004) (describing the decrease in abortion-related mortality following liberalization); Frederick E. Nunes & Yvette M. Delph, Making Abortion Law Reform
Work: Steps and Slips in Guyana, 9 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 66, 66, 71 (1997)
(describing the decrease in hospital admissions for septic and incomplete abortion following liberalization).
293
Shah & Ahman, supra note 1, at 93; Singh & Ratnam, supra note 291, at S127.
294
Shah & Ahman, supra note 1, at 90; see also David A. Grimes, Janie Benson,
Susheela Singh, Mariana Romero, Bela Ganatra, Friday E. Okonofua & Iqbal H. Shah,
Unsafe Abortion: The Preventable Pandemic, 368 LANCET 1908, 1908 (2006).
295
Singh & Ratnam, supra note 291, at S127. Liberalization alone is insufficient to
guarantee safe abortion. In Cambodia, India, Ethiopia, Nepal, and South Africa, for example, women continue to resort to unsafe abortion, despite liberalization, where safe and
lawful services are not available or accessible. Shah & Ahman, supra note 1, at 94, 96.
296
Grimes et al., supra note 294, at 1913.
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cate legal reform under a harm reduction rationale.297 The Uruguay Model
literature reflects this view: “decriminalization of abortion is the most effective means to reduce maternal deaths, on the condition that safe abortion
services became available.”298
International human rights law engages with criminal abortion law in
the pragmatic terms of harm reduction. The approaches strongly converge in
this respect. Punishment of abortion as an illegal act is identified as a cause
of unsafe abortion and related death and disability.299 Laws “likely to result
in bodily harm, unnecessary morbidity, and preventable mortality” are expressly declared in violation of human rights.300 The relationship between
criminal law and unsafe abortion thus grounds violations of the human rights
to life and health,301 and state obligations for legal review and reform.
“[L]aws that criminalize medical procedures only needed by women and
that punish women who undergo these procedures” are declared inconsistent
with the right to non-discrimination in health.302 States are called upon to
amend, “[w]hen possible, legislation criminalizing abortion . . . to withdraw
punitive measures imposed on women who undergo abortion,”303 to ensure
that women need not resort to unsafe abortion.304
C. Criminal Law Reform and Human Rights
The neutrality and pragmatic principles of harm reduction are related.
By assessing law in pragmatic terms, harm reduction need not engage with
the normative commitments underlying prohibition or decriminalization.305
As described in the Uruguay Model literature, harm reduction identifies a
297
Reinarman, supra note 12, at 240 (arguing for legal change regarding drugs due to
the “human toll of punitive prohibition”).
298
Briozzo et al., Risk Reduction Strategy, supra note 2, at 225.
299
CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Timor-Leste, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/TLS/CO/1 (Aug. 7,
2009). In a 1999 report on Colombia, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
identified criminalization, together with unsafe methods, as the reason abortion is the
second leading cause of maternal death in the country. Third Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Colombia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1,
Chapter XII ¶ 51 (Feb. 26, 1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/colom
99en/table%20of%20contents.htm.
300
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 85, ¶ 50.
301
CEDAW Concluding Comments: Colombia, supra note 279, ¶ 393. See also
CEDAW Concluding Observations: Tuvalu, supra note 78, ¶ 44; CESCR Concluding Observations: Brazil, supra note 77, ¶ 29; CEDAW Concluding Observations: Panama,
supra note 78, ¶ 43; HRC Concluding Observations: Chile, supra note 77, ¶ 8.
302
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 84, ¶ 14.
303
Id. ¶ 31(c).
304
HRC Concluding Observations: Chile, supra note 77, ¶ 8; HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: El Salvador, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/
SLV (July 22, 2003); HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Madagascar, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MDG/CO/3 (June 2, 2009); HRC, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Poland, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/82/
POL (Dec. 2, 2004).
305
Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction, supra note 14, at 125.
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space for action irrespective of the legal framework.306 Recall this is the
claimed advantage of value-neutrality.
Neutrality can also be a distinct disadvantage. By finding a space for
interventions to reduce health-related harms, often through individual behavior change, any legal framework can be made to work—that is, to no longer
contribute to morbidity and mortality. Harm reduction functions as a “bandaid” or “safety net.”307 If prohibition can be made to work, there is no
reason on pragmatic grounds to reject it. Harm reduction interventions
moreover—by reducing harm—may be the very means by which prohibition
becomes an acceptable legal framework, including in a human rights approach where accountability is based on a harm reduction rationale.308 The
consequences are heavily critiqued: “by ameliorating their worst effects,
harm reduction simply relieves the institutions of prohibition . . . of responsibility for those harms. It reduces their incentive to fundamentally change
those damaging policies.”309
No mere hypothetical, this was precisely the consequence in the most
recent case on abortion from the European Court of Human Rights, A. B. &
C. v. Ireland.310 The criminal law in Ireland, which prohibits all abortion
except when necessary to save the life of the woman, was held consistent
with international human rights law.311 The prohibition was acceptable primarily because of harm reduction measures that ensure women can access
safe and lawful abortion abroad. The Court carefully detailed the legislative
measures adopted to ensure provision of information and counseling (with
reference to Open Door), and any necessary medical treatment before and
after the abortion.312 The Court further noted the important role of physicians in providing information on all options available, including abortion
abroad.313
[H]aving regard to the right to lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with access to appropriate information and medical care in
Ireland, the Court does not consider that the prohibition . . . exceeds the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the
Irish State. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance . . . .314
Harm reduction is well suited to reveal the rational flaws in prohibition,
but when the injustice of a prohibition does not derive from its ineffective306

Carino et al., supra note 2, at 77; Faúndes et al., supra note 2, at 166.
Miller, supra note 80, at 177.
308
Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction, supra note 14, at 125–26.
309
Roe, supra note 16, at 247.
310
A. B. & C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2032 (2010), available at
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/2032.html.
311
Id. ¶ 241.
312
Id. ¶ 239
313
Id.
314
Id. ¶ 241.
307

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\34-2\HLG202.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 49

Access to Information on Safe Abortion

13-JUN-11

8:03

461

ness or dysfunction, the value-neutrality and pragmatic orientation of harm
reduction are themselves harmful.315 Harm reduction leaves the reasons behind the law unexamined and thus intact, passively supporting the status
quo.316 By allowing a criminal law that offends a normative commitment to
stand—where prohibition is not simply irrational but immoral—harm reduction converges not with human rights but with their violation.317
Criminal abortion laws violate women’s human rights for reasons more
than their contribution to unsafe abortion and related death and disability.
These laws often derive from a characterization of abortion as normatively
wrong. A neutral and pragmatic harm reduction approach refuses to engage
with abortion as a normative matter. It offers no counter understanding of
abortion to contest prohibition. International human rights law is a stark
contrast in this respect. Criminal abortion laws are interpreted to violate
women’s rights where they deny normative plurality on the meaning and
significance of abortion. These laws fail to give due respect to abortion—a
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy—as an act of self-determination. The European Court of Human Rights in Tysiac v. Poland acknowledged that abortion touches on a woman’s private life, protected as a human
right.318 Private life includes physical and mental health, but extends beyond. The right to private life “include[s] the right to personal autonomy,
personal development and to establish and develop relationships with other
human beings and the outside world.”319 The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights similarly emphasized that abortion “constitutes a very serious problem for . . . women, not only from a health perspective, but also
considering their rights as women, which include the rights to personal integrity and to privacy.”320 Within a human rights discourse, harm is located
in the law, not its health-related effects. The challenge to the law is epistemic: to introduce new forms of knowledge and thinking about the act of
abortion, and to contest existing forms as means of oppression and
domination.
Decriminalization, when it does occur, often results from a shift in normative judgment rather than a pragmatic, effects-based assessment.321
315
Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction, supra note 14, at 135 (describing
how the failure to establish and articulate the moral warrants behind harm reduction renders the approach strategically flawed to address prohibition).
316
Miller, supra note 80, at 173.
317
Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction, supra note 14, at 135. Danny
Kushlick and Steve Rolles similarly question whether harm reduction leads us to “collude with a policy that invariably degrades and sometimes destroys our clients and the
communities in which they live.” Kushlick & Rolles, supra note 72, at 245.
318
Tysiac v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42, 969 (2007) (citing
Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 244
(1981)).
319
Id.
320
Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 299,
Chapter XII ¶ 51.
321
Hathaway & Erickson, supra note 14, at 483.
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Human rights allows for criminal abortion laws to be challenged on grounds
of power, equality, and freedom, not merely on health-related effects.
Human rights provide a means to articulate the wrong of criminal abortion
laws in normative, not simply rational terms, in the service of broad social
change.
CONCLUSION
Whether access to safer-use information on abortion—or the Uruguay
Model specifically—should or can be defended as a harm reduction or
human rights approach is a question neither raised nor addressed in this Article. The conceptual and discursive dimensions of the two approaches do not
admit to a single or easy prescription.
The objectives of the Article were more modest: the first, to provide
normative validation for state action to permit and facilitate access to saferuse information on abortion as a harm reduction intervention; and second, to
use international human rights law to guide action on unsafe abortion with a
normative commitment.
While the comparison and contrast of harm reduction and human rights
can be illuminating, “there is the danger of a kind of political romanticism in
which the everyday, practical achievements of [harm reduction] programs
. . . are minimised by being measured against a goal of perfect freedom [in
human rights].”322 The concrete achievements of harm reduction should not
be set against the sweeping transformative aspirations of human rights.323
There is nothing limiting about meeting the immediate needs of women to
protect their lives and health in any legal environment. Such is the view
adopted in the Uruguay Model: “[w]e should clearly differentiate what is
desirable as a final objective from what is possible.”324 Yet the final objective should not be abandoned, and thus the preceding statement continues:
“while at the same time . . . generating conditions for the advancement of a
long term solution.”325 Harm reduction may generate these conditions, shifting the discourse on abortion from crime to health and making prohibition
inappropriate on pragmatic grounds. “[H]arm reduction may well be a necessary step towards broader reform where more confrontational challenges
to the dominant order are still too politically volatile.”326 Political volatility
is not always to be avoided, however, in the same way that gradualist reform
is not always inevitable.327 The realization of women’s human rights to safe
abortion may simply necessitate confrontation with the dominant normative
order.
322

Keane, supra note 66, at 229.
Id. at 229.
324
Briozzo et al., Iniciativas Sanitarias, supra note 2, at 21.
325
Id.
326
Hathaway, Shortcomings of Harm Reduction, supra note 14, at 132.
327
Id. at 134–36 (summarizing the shortcomings of a harm reduction movement that
avoids challenges to prohibition in ideological terms).
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